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Chinese imperialism, Japanese occupation, and the sustained involvement of 
United States in the southern half of the peninsula, have created a strong sense of 
nationalism in North Korea that has shaped its ideological principle Juché or “self-
reliance.”  This policy has evolved to benefit the North Korean regime.  First, it was a 
tool used to disengage from Chinese and Soviet influences.  Then, it became a principle 
that the DPRK used to “make friends” and seek legitimacy.  Later, the DPRK 
concentrated on its military capabilities, conventional and nuclear.  The result was a 
regime that was willing and able to sell weapons and technology to the highest bidder.  In 
more recent years, Juché has further evolved, becoming a tool for economic terrorism.   
The 1994 nuclear crisis, the 1998 Taepodong firing, the suspected nuclear facility 
at Kumchangri, and the 2002 disclosure of WMDs are crises exploited by the DPRK for 
economic gain. The current situation, together with Pyongyang's record of proliferating 
WMD technology, poses a clear and present danger to U.S. national security.  This thesis 
explores previous U.S policy attempts and failures, examines challenges faced by the 
current administration, and explores options for short term and long-term resolution of 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. PURPOSE  
In his State of the Union Address on January 29, 2002, President George W. Bush 
described the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) as a member of the “Axis 
of Evil.”  This thesis takes the position the leaders of the DPRK are cunning, determined, 
and somewhat desperate.  In order to combat the DPRK’s manipulative stratagem for 
economic gain, the United States and other major players in the Asia-Pacific region need 
join together and take a united and inflexible approach in their policies towards North 
Korea.  This thesis will analyze historical patterns, geographical and geopolitical 
environment, and the entangled relationships of the DPRK, the United States, the 
Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and to a lesser 
extent, Russia, to propose a new path to stability on the Korean peninsula – a Multilateral 
Asia Security Coalition. 
 
B. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses both historical and comparative methodologies.  First, the thesis 
focuses on information about historical relationships regarding North Korea.  This 
relationship information is used later in the thesis to outline how Japan, the United States, 
the PRC and the ROK can maximize their relationships in this time of upheaval on the 
Korean peninsula.  Second, information regarding past crises on the peninsula is outlined, 
and parallels are drawn to the current crisis with North Korea.  The thesis then uses both 
the relationship and past crisis information to outline what steps should be taken to 
alleviate the crisis and to prevent history from further repeating itself.  
 
C. LIMITATIONS 
This thesis makes two assumptions about Kim Jong Il.  First, it takes him at his 
word, that his regime sees the United States as a legitimate threat to his national security.  
And second, it assumes that Kim Jong Il is willing to work to get his country out of the 
1
desperate economic situation that it is in.  Also, it is not within the scope of this thesis to 
provide detailed information about the domestic political systems in the Asian countries 
but instead, those issues with a direct impact on regional security and/or U.S. policy will 
be outlined.    
 
D. CHAPTER-BY-CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Chapter I: This chapter will provide the purpose of this thesis, methodology, 
limitations of space and subject matter, chapter summaries, and an overview of how the 
subject matter is relevant to the United States. 
Chapter II: In order to understand the economic, political and security issues that 
North Korean leaders face today, it is necessary to understand how their current 
environment evolved.  This chapter will provide a look at some of the formative events in 
pre-occupied and occupied Korea, and provide a brief background on the Korean War, 
the various alliances and relationships had by the soon-to-be North Korea, and the Soviet-
American tug-of war that caused the country to be divided. 
Chapter III: In several ways, the Cold War affected the way the DPRK conducts 
its business today.  Section one is entitled “Born of Necessity – the Juche Ideology” and 
outlines how, during the Cold War, the DPRK formed alliances primarily with the Soviet 
Union and China.  Post Korean War tensions between these two countries ensued and it 
was during this period that the leaders of the DPRK developed the policy of Juché.  
Based on the principle of self-reliance, Juché is still touted by the North Korean 
government as official policy.  This section will discuss how Juché has evolved over 
time.  It will show that Juché was first used in an attempt at Cold War neutrality, then as 
a tool for legitimacy, as a tool for national defense, and currently how North Korean 
policymakers have modified the meaning of Juché and have used it as a tool for profit.  
Chapter IV: This chapter is the main focus for the thesis.  It will outline how the 
DPRK’s policies have evolved into what can be called economic terrorism.  It will 
discuss how the DPRK has utilized nuclear proliferation in an attempt to extort money 
from the international community.  It will discuss the Crisis of 1994 and the advent of the 
2
Agreed Framework and KEDO, the Kumchang-Ri incident, the launch of the Taepo 
Dong missile over Japan and most recently, the disclosure that Pyongyang possesses 
weapons of mass destruction. The thesis will outline how each of these crises were 
carefully calculated and executed by Pyongyang – all for economic gain. 
Chapter V: This chapter will outline the policies that the United States has 
attempted to pursue regarding the DPRK.  It will discuss the threat that the Kim Jong Il 
regime poses, and how it continues to make demands in order to gain economic 
concessions from the United States.  
Chapter VI: The primary recommendation of this thesis will focus on Japan, the 
ROK, the United States, China and Russia, forming a security coalition.  This coalition 
should employ firm methods to stop North Korea’s “exploitation for profit” schemes. 
This chapter will look at the relationships the DPRK has with its neighbors and sets the 
stage for each’s position in the Asia Security Coalition (ASC).  The chapter will discuss 
the role of the U.S. in providing increased security to the DPRK, via gradual military 
disengagement from the peninsula.  It will then briefly outline the DPRK’s previous 
relationships with, and the economic role each of the members of the ASC will play. 
Finally this chapter will contain concluding statements. 
 
E. RELEVANCE TO THE UNITED STATES  
Long before President Bush’s State of the Union address, U.S. policymakers 
considered the Korean peninsula a highly volatile area.  Since the end of the Cold War, 
North Korea has displayed antagonistic policies and actions that have threatened regional 
stability.  This thesis proposes that the North Korean threat was born of their Juché 
ideology and economic desperation.  A strong argument exists that the regime is the 
“bully” of the East, manipulating its neighbors in order to extort money from them.   In 
addition, threats to United States’ national security from Southwest Asia, and the 
potential for North Korean support to these enemies require a reassessment of, and plans 
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II. NORTHERN KOREA TO THE DPRK: A BRIEF HISTORY 
A. PRE-DIVISION AND COLONIAL LEGACY 
1. Chinese Influence 
Well before the birth of Christ, the Chinese had a presence in Korea. The Koreans 
had a historical bond with, and considered themselves “little brothers” to the Chinese. 
Among other things, social structure and government were “borrowed” and “adapted” 
from China.  The influence that China had on early Korea is indicated by the fact that it 
has been called a “Chinese type of state,” with Chinese influences in all parts of Korean 
culture and civilization.1  Chinese civilization had a lasting impact on Korea’s religion 
and government.  Confucianism became a major aspect of Korean society.  Personal and 
professional relationships were formed based on Confucian hierarchy.  In addition, the 
Chinese political and civil service examination systems were incorporated into Korean 
society.   The Koreans, however, had fought for thousands of years to escape Chinese 
imperialism, so it was important for them to consider these adaptations distinctly 
“Korean.”  It was this sense of Korean nationalism that was present during, and further 
promoted by the Japanese occupation.2   
2. The Occupation 
Unlike the legacy of modernization that the Japanese left on Taiwan, it was a 
legacy of colonialism that was more prevalent in Korea.  While economic growth had 
occurred during the occupation, to most Koreans any benefits had gone to the Japanese.3  
In addition, the atrocities that the Japanese committed against the Korean people were 
unbearable.  In the Japanese version of colonialism, there was no attempt to integrate the 
Korean people’s culture into Japanese colonial society, rather there was a deliberate 
attempt to erase Korean religion and culture, and literally to beat the Koreans into 
submission.   
                                                 
1John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig. East Asia, Tradition and 
Transformation. (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1989), title, chapter 11. 
2 Ibid, 907. 
3 Ibid, 149. 
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The colonial period also “brought forth an entirely new set of Korean political 
leaders spawned by both the resistance to and the opportunities of Japanese 
colonialism.”4  In 1919 a group of intellectuals petitioned for independence from Japan 
and touched off mass protests that continued for months.  These protesters, as well as 
another group of armed resisters in the 1930s, were fiercely put down by the Japanese, 
causing many younger Koreans to become militant opponents of colonial rule, and 
furthering the Korean sense of nationalism.5 Police repression of this kind made it 
impossible for radical groups to exist for any length of time.  Some Korean militants went 
into exile in China and the Soviet Union and founded early communist and nationalist 
resistance groups.  Other nationalist and communist leaders, including members of 
guerrilla insurgent groups, were jailed in the early 1930s, but were released back to Korea 
at the end of World War II.  It was from this environment that Kim Il Sung entered the 
Korean picture.  Kim became what the Japanese considered one of the most effective and 
dangerous of the guerillas, and resisting the Japanese became the legitimating doctrine of 
what would become North Korea.6 
Today, North Koreans claim that Kim Il Sung alone led the anti-Japanese 
movement which ultimately defeated the Japanese, while South Koreans claim that North 
Korea’s former ruler simply stole the name of a revered patriot.  Regardless, Kim Il Sung 
had become what the Japanese considered one of the most effective and dangerous of 
guerrillas.  Resisting the Japanese became the “main legitimating doctrine of North 
Korea: North Koreans trace the origin of their army, leadership, and ideology back to this 
resistance.”7  For the next fifty years, the top North Korean leaders were made up of a 
group of these men who had fought the Japanese.  
In the 1940s, while the Japanese were concentrating on their war effort, there was 
a labor shortage throughout the Korean colony.  It was during this period that a minority 
                                                 
4 “Country Study: North Korea,” Library of Congress, Federal Research Division [online] 
<http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/kptoc.html> 
NOTE: While these Country Studies are used extensively throughout this thesis, the bibliography for 
the country study is thorough and diverse.  It includes well-published authors on Korean issues such as 
Bruce Cumings, Robert Scalapino, and Nicholas Eberstadt. 
5 Fairbank, 909. 
6 “Country Study: North Korea.” 
7 Ibid. 
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of Koreans became trained in government, local administration, police and judicial work, 
economic planning agencies, banks, and the like.  This advancement became a divisive 
factor in the country, however, because this period was also the harshest of Japanese rule, 
a harshness that Koreans still remember with great bitterness.  Korean culture continued 
to be repressed; Shinto, the Japanese state religion attempted to replace the Korean 
version of Confucian values; and the Korean elite were required to speak Japanese and 
take Japanese names.  The majority suffered badly at the precise time that a minority was 
doing well which created a stigma on the latter that was never lost.  In fact, the treatment 
of collaborators became a sensitive and sometimes violent issue during the years 
immediately following liberation.8   
For the most part, when the colonial system ended in 1945, many of the Koreans 
who were displaced during the occupation were not the same when they returned to their 
villages.  Many had ill feelings towards those who had remained at home, while they had 
suffered material and status losses, had often come into contact with new ideologies, and 
had seen a broader world beyond the villages.  It was this group of disgruntled people 
that were left in the early post-World War II period, prostrate to the plans of the United 
States and the Soviet Union.9  
 
B. THE KOREAN WAR (RUSSO-AMERICAN TUG-OF-WAR) 
In 1943 at the Cairo Conference – China, the United States and Great Britain 
showed concern for Korea.  In their communiqué, they described themselves as: “mindful 
of the enslavement of the people of Korea” and stated that they were “determined that in 
due course Korea shall become free and independent.”10  
In 1945, the removal of Japanese forces from Korea opened up a power vacuum, 
which the Russians and Americans filled.  The Russians wanted to take control of setting 
up a government for Korea.  The United States, however, did not want to allow the 
                                                 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
10 “Cairo Conference 1943,” The Avalon Project, Yale Law School [online] 
<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/cairo.htm > 
7
Soviets so much influence and was more concerned about letting the Koreans establish 
their own government.  The two countries decided to split up Korea temporarily until the 
government was setup.  Officials in the United States chose the 38th parallel as the 
dividing line.  The Soviets entered the country first and stopped at the agreed line, which 
indicated that they had no intentions of reneging on their side of the agreement.11 
1. Politics on the Peninsula   
After the occupation, Koreans wanted to solve their own problems and they 
resented insinuations by the Soviets and Americans that they were not ready for self-
government.  The general consensus, however, was that the Koreans were not prepared 
for independence and state building.  Since the Japanese had ruled with such an iron fist, 
when Korea was divided up between the United States and Soviet Union, the northern 
Koreans were vulnerable to the heavy-handed Soviet system that was imposed on them.  
This new system, at least, put Koreans in charge of Koreans, which they saw as an 
improvement.  From 1947 to 1948, North Korea was under relative Soviet dominance – 
relative because Koreans were still representative in their own government.12  
In 1947, the UN General Assembly recognized Korea's claim to independence 
and prepared to establish a government and withdraw occupation forces.  A year later, in 
1948, the UN supervised the election of a national assembly, which was held in May 
1948.  The Soviet Union objected to the UN resolution and refused to admit the UN into 
the Soviet-controlled zone in the north.  It became increasingly clear that two separate 
regimes would be established on the peninsula.13  
In the south political leaders felt they had two choices; either to pursue 
independence at the price of indefinite division, or postpone independence until the U.S. 
and USSR could resolve their differences.  Syngman Rhee had campaigned for the 
former.  Two major opposition players, Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, opposed separate 
elections in the south, and instead hoped to resolve the issue by holding talks with their 
                                                 
11 Michael Yahuda, The International Politics of the Asia Pacific, 1945-1995. (New York, 
Routledge,1997), 23. 
12 Bruce Cumings, Korea’s Place in the Sun: A Modern History. (New York, W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1997), 227. 
13 “Country Study: South Korea,” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress [online] 
<http://memory.loc.gov/frd/cs/krtoc.html> 
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northern counterparts.14  In April 1948, the two Kims went to P'yongyang, and indeed 
boycotted the elections a month later to show their sincerity. 15 
Since the opposition was not participating in the elections, Syngman Rhee was 
left with the decisive advantage.  In May of 1948, the National Assembly adopted a 
constitution, which set up a presidential form of government.  First Rhee became head of 
the new assembly and shortly thereafter, when the Republic of Korea (ROK) was 
proclaimed, Rhee became president. 16   Despite the attempts at negotiation by the Kims, 
four days after the ROK was established, communist authorities shut off power to the 
south from one of the few power plants in the country.  Within less than a month, the 
communists set up their own regime, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea 
(DPRK).  Premier Kim Il Sung, claimed authority over the entire country according to the 
results of elections conducted in the north and of underground elections that were 
allegedly held in the south.17 
With the northern regime in place, the Soviets withdrew their occupation troops.  
With the southern government established, the United States no longer felt compelled to 
continue their occupation and by June 1949, had withdrawn their forces except for a few 
military advisers; Korea had been placed outside the United States’ defense perimeter.18 
2. The War 
When the country was split, North Korea had a historical relationship with China 
and a more contemporary relationship with the Soviet Union.  Despite the fact that the 
two communist powers had an “alliance” with each other, it was obvious that there was 
distrust between them.  It was in this environment that the North Koreans found 
themselves at the onset of the Korean War.  Before the DPRK was established, northern 
Koreans had been careful to remain friendly with both China and Russia, while not 
alienating either.  Despite their differences, however, in 1950, both Mao and Stalin gave 
Kim Il-Sung the go-ahead to seek to reunify Korea by force.  It seemed that North Korea 
                                                 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Cumings, 235. 
17 “Country study: South Korea.” 
18 Ibid. 
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was prepared to do so as well.  A top-secret text from 1947, later captured by Americans 
during the war, showed that one-fifth of the country’s total budget went to defense.19 
Although Soviet troops had been removed from the North, the Soviet Union 
played a major part in the war.  It was the Soviets who were responsible for establishing 
and arming the Kim regime right up to late Spring 1950.  It is possible that Stalin may 
have even approved Kim’s war plans with a view to increasing the Soviet influence over 
China.20  Another motivating factor besides Soviet support was a deep-seated resentment 
of the enemy.  The officer corps of the South Korean army during the Rhee period was 
dominated by Koreans with experience in the Japanese army.  At least in part, the Korean 
War became a matter of Japanese-trained military officers fighting “Japanese-spawned 
resistance leaders.”21  
Despite these motivating factors, within a month of the start of the invasion, 
North Korean forces seized all but a small corner of southeastern Korea near Pusan.  
Heavy Air Force bombing coupled with resistance by combined U.S. and South Korean 
forces in this area prevented Kim Il Sung from reunifying the peninsula.  In addition, 
General MacArthur landed at Inchon, and severed the lines of communication and supply 
between the North Korean army and the north.  The army collapsed, and combined forces 
forced Kim Il Sung's seriously damaged army northward. 
There is no indication that the Civil War-torn Chinese were directly involved in 
preparations for the Korean War, or that they intended to become involved in it.  When 
UN forces chased Kim’s army across the 38th parallel and headed for the Chinese border, 
however, that changed.  “What was seen by the UN as a move towards uniting Korea, 
was perceived by Mao as a threat to China’s security and the survival of his newly 
established revolutionary regime.”22 
During the Chinese Civil War, Kim Il Sung sent tens of thousands of Korean 
soldiers to fight for Mao in Manchuria.  At the end of 1948, at the same time the Soviets 
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were withdrawing their troops, the Koreans were coming home.  They brought with them 
new military training and field experience and also bonds with the Chinese.  It was these 
bonds, which would eventually see-saw North Korea towards China during the Sino-
Soviet split.23  When Kim’s regime was “nearly extinguished” in 1950, the Soviet Union 
did little to help, instead, “China picked up the pieces.”24  The North Koreans, with the 
help of the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, pushed United States and South Korean 
forces out of North Korea within a month.  The strength of the powerful Chinese army 
and the North Koreans turned out to be quite a match for the United States/South Korean 
combined force.  Physically, by the time the armistice was signed in 1953, the North had 
endured three years of bombing attacks that left few modern buildings standing – again 
the Soviets offered little in the way of aid.  After a prolonged struggle, the war ended in a 
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III. THE DPRK AND THE EVOLUTION OF JUCHE 
A. BORN OF NECESSITY - THE JUCHE IDEOLOGY  
When the Korean War was over, it seemed to the rest of the world that the Sino-
Soviet alliance was strengthened.  In reality, tensions began to build between the two 
countries because Mao Tse-Tung felt that Joseph Stalin had reneged on promises to 
support him more directly in Korea.25  As the Cold War progressed and Sino-Soviet 
interests split, so did their relations.  These relations deteriorated quickly when the 
Chinese became discontent with Nikita Khrushchev and his policies.  Mao believed the 
new Soviet doctrine of peaceful coexistence with the West was a betrayal of Marxism-
Leninism.26  Levels of Soviet aid decreased markedly, and there was only feeble Soviet 
support for China in its disputes with Taiwan and India. Against Khrushchev’s wishes, 
“China embarked on a nuclear arms program, declaring in 1960 that nuclear war could 
defeat imperialism.”27  After 1960, the relationship between the “moderate” Soviet Union 
and “militant” China degenerated into “a schism in the world communist movement…” 
and their relations with Moscow or Beijing divided communist parties around the 
world.28   
After the signing of the truce that ended the Korean War, the North Koreans were 
disappointed in the Soviet Union for not providing greater assistance to the war effort.29  
To the Soviets, Korea was strategically important as a buffer to Japanese rearmament.  
So, in a gesture of good will, the Soviets gave Kim Il Sung enough aid to give the 
economy a boost. 30  This was not enough to garner North Korean support.  The North 
Koreans were, however, impressed with the Chinese military support they had received.31  
This support, and the bonds the Northern Koreans had made with the Chinese communist 
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army, coupled with the historical bonds that the two countries shared, made it relatively 
easy for the North Koreans to side with the Chinese during the split.  Because of North 
Korean support for the Chinese, the Soviet Union stopped economic aid to North Korea 
in the early 1960s.32  Similar to the Soviet government’s other diplomatic and military 
relations, this cessation of aid see-sawed throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as leaders vied 
for support against the Chinese.  
It was not until the 1980s that North Korea began a tilt in diplomacy back toward 
the Soviet Union.  When they did, it was in response to the Soviets providing quite a bit 
of financial aid.  When Mikhail Gorbachev took over the administration, however, 
Soviet/DPRK relations were not as warm.  He cut back Soviet aid to the DPRK, and 
criticized the North Koreans for unwise spending of the aid they received.33 
In addition, China-DPRK relations took a drastic turn in the 1980s.  At first, 
China stood at a distance and encouraged Kim Il Sung to engage in talks with Seoul and 
Washington.  Then Chinese leaders reached out to Seoul, and by the end of the decade, 
were engaging in more trade with South Korea than with the North.  With both of their 
Cold War allies turning elsewhere, the DPRK looked elsewhere for support.  
In the late 1940s and throughout the 1950s, more than 90 percent of DPRK trade 
was conducted bilaterally, mostly with the Soviets and with China.  The economic 
dependence on, and subsequent loss of economic support from, the Soviets facilitated 
Kim’s creation of the Juché (literally “self-reliance”) policy.  After Stalin’s death in 
1953, and following the Soviet secession of aid, Kim Il Sung needed a way to further 
disengage from Soviet influence – thus the policy of Juché was born. 
 
B. A TOOL FOR DISENGAGEMENT 
Kim Il Sung described Juché as "the independent stance of rejecting dependence 
on others and of using one's own powers, believing in one's own strength and displaying 
the revolutionary spirit of self-reliance.”34  Born of necessity, this principle was eagerly 
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adopted by a people who had endured forced rule from outsiders for so long.  Not only 
did this principle help North Koreans formulate plans to cope with their economic 
difficulties, it also helped Pyongyang maintain an “equidistant diplomacy toward Beijing 
and Moscow, while the two allies were engaged in disputes.”35  The Juché philosophy 
evolved almost into a form of religious doctrine, so that “Juché has come to permeate all 
aspects of North Korea life, and it seems to have taken hold of the thought processes and 
belief systems of the people.”36  Even a conservative estimate suggests that it is possibe 
that over one-quarter of the general population have developed unwavering faith in 
Juché. 37 
Juché, however, did not dictate specific policy.  In the years since its inception, 
the Juché ideology has evolved.  At first, it was used as a reactionary tool to save face 
and to disengage when a relationship has been terminated.  Besides helping deal with the 
loss of aid from the Soviets, for example, Juché was used as an instrument to breed 
nationalism that served as a basis for regime legitimacy, established North Korea’s 
superiority over South Korea, and further promoted anti-foreign ideas.38 
Later, Juché evolved into more of a “world view” with human-centered 
philosophical notions at its foundation, 39 not unlike national solipsism.  This allowed 
North Korea to reach out to other countries in the world and to foster economic 
relationships with them.  
Most recently, the ideology has been used to justify policies of self-sufficiency 
and national self-defense.40  Most times however, Juché is used to support any policy that 
results in economic gain, through policies that range from isolation to globalization.   In 
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contrast to Marx, for example, Kim Il-Sung said that man's “subjective will to achieve” is 
the determining factor in deciding history, including economic development. 41 
 
C. A TOOL FOR LEGITIMACY (MAKING FRIENDS) 
After the Korean War, South Korea continued to hope for a reunified Korea under 
Seoul-based leadership.  Because of postwar financial difficulties and the cessation of 
Soviet aid, President Park Chung Hee reached out to Kim Il Sung, offering aid in return 
for the abolition of the Juché policy.  To Kim, this was not an option, the ideology was 
the cornerstone of his legitimacy in the country.  Thus he refused to form an official 
relationship with the ROK. Shortly thereafter, it became apparent that South Korea was 
playing the “legitimize my government, undermine yours” game with the DPRK.  When 
the DPRK first supported, and later formally joined the non-aligned movement (NAM), 
its official purpose was to reach out to other countries to build relationships, and to gain 
international recognition.  In addition, Kim was harvesting a new crop of financial 
resources.  As these relationships were forming, North Korea’s stance became more 
revolutionary in nature.  Kim Il Sung professed to be the leader of the non-aligned 
movement, making it his mission in life to “lead the world in the struggle against 
imperialism.”42   
Within North Korea, Kim Il Sung made an important adjustment in the ideology 
by incorporating another principle into it – that of “national solipsism.”  This principle is 
based on the assumption that the world tends toward Korea, with all eyes on Kim Il 
Sung.43  In addition, it projects the idea that Korea is the center of the world and that it 
has a responsibility to “export” Juché, especially to Third World countries that the North 
Koreans think are ready for it.44  Inherent in the adoption of these interlocked principles 
is the fact that North Korea needed to establish relationships with other countries with the 
ultimate “official” goal: the export of Juché.       
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In Latin America, although they invited political and cultural exchanges with 
many countries, the DPRK focused on building political and social relations with 
communist Cuba; a symbol of the communist triumph over the United States.45  In 
Africa, the DPRK focused its relations on the states of West Africa.  After a political visit 
in 1961, North Korea entered trade, cultural and other relations with Mali; consular 
relations with the United Arab Republic, Morocco and Ghana; and formed diplomatic 
relations with Guinea, Mali and Algeria.  Romanian-North Korean relations began to 
develop during the Cold War.  These two countries had come from a similar background 
of dependence on the Soviet Union, forming a bond through mutual admiration.  Right in 
line with the exportation of Juché, in 1964 a statement was issued by the Romanian 
“Central Committee” declaring the right of Romania and all other nations to “develop 
national policies in the light of their own interests and domestic requirements.”46  
Another relationship worth mentioning was that between North Korea and Burma.  
Quite possibly as a result of the DPRK’s export of independence-based ideology, the 
Burmese army led the Revolutionary Council in overthrowing the government and setting 
up a socialist system. 47   In the 1960s, the Burmese Revolutionary Council published 
their economic policies in a statement known as “The Burmese Way to Socialism” – 
quite reminiscent of Marxism-Leninism and Korean Juché.48  High-level visits had been 
exchanged and Burma supported North Korea’s position in the UN.  In 1983, that 
relationship ended when North Korean military officials detonated a bomb at a wreath-
laying ceremony in a Rangoon national cemetery in an attempt to assassinate the South 
Korean President Chun Doo Hwan.  The blast killed seventeen South Koreans, including 
four cabinet members, and four Burmese at the revered site. 
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D. A TOOL FOR NATIONAL DEFENSE (MAKING ENEMIES) 
Juché declares that man creates his own destiny and must be self-sufficient.  If 
this principle is applied to explaining the Japanese occupation of the peninsula, Korea 
had only itself to blame for not being able to ward off the invaders.  In addition, the loss 
of the Korean War then, would also be the fault of the leaders of North Korea.  While 
these statements oversimplify the principle, and would not likely be accepted by leaders 
of either of the Koreas, they illustrate the environment Kim Il Sung came from when he 
contemplated the national security of the DPRK.  Kim Il Sung could no longer rely on the 
Soviets and the Chinese for full military support and he definitely perceived a physical 
threat to the security of his country.  With the Japanese subdued, the Chinese historical 
allies and the Soviets embroiled in a Cold War, the major threat was from the United 
States on the southern border.  Kim Il Sung thus created a Juché-based defense plan – a 
plan that has not only allowed North Korea to be defensive and free from invasion, but to 
be offensive as well – viewed as a threat to other nations. 
1. 
                                                
Conventional Weapons 
While much emphasis has been placed on North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, the 
United States, its assets and other countries in Northeast Asia have much to fear from 
North Korea’s conventional forces.  North Korea is “renowned, and in some circles 
infamous, as a military power, devoting about 30 percent of its budget to national 
defense.”49  Based on the ratio of its population and its economy to its military spending, 
North Korea is the most militarized nation on earth.50   
While its economy has continued to deflate, the DPRK has continued to upgrade 
its military capabilities.  From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the North devoted an 
estimated 15 to 20 percent of its economy to its military.51  In a steady buildup between 
1971 and 1972, the result was a force of 680,000 ground troops (about one out of every 
twenty citizens), and more than double the number of South Korea’s tanks and artillery 
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pieces.52  It was the threat posed by this conventional force, coupled with the discovery 
of North Korean-built tunnels under the DMZ, that caused President Carter and his 
administration to drop its program of U.S. troop withdrawal.  Another such buildup was 
conducted in 1995-1996, quite possibly the result of witnessing U.S. military power 
during the Gulf War.53  
In 1994, the United States intelligence sources focused seriously on the DPRK 
due to the nuclear proliferation crisis that resulted in the Agreed Framework.54 Although 
information on North Korea’s military capabilities is not in great supply, a full 
investigation was conducted on the military capability of Pyongyang in 1994.  According 
to this report, and other more current sources, a picture may be drawn of the current 
capabilities of the DPRK’s military.  
The North Korean Armed Forces are more than one million strong and consist of 
the People's Armed Forces, the regular armed forces; the People's Security Guards, a 
paramilitary force; and civilian forces including the Workers and Farmers Red Guards 
and the Young Red Guards.55  This force is broken down into the Army, Navy and Air 
Forces. 
a. ARMY (KNA) 
The DPRK’s KNA is one million strong, with millions more in militias.  
There are thought to be “enormous military bases and arsenals built deep underground, 
subway stations with gigantic blast doors recessed into the walls, a dictator who sleeps in 
a different place every night for security reasons, and round the clock vigils for trouble 
along the DMZ.”56   
The KNA is armed 2,500 multiple rocket launchers, and more than 10,000 surface 
to air missiles. 57  There are more than 6,000 tanks and armored personnel carriers, and 
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over 11,000 pieces of artillery.58  In addition, the DPRK has several types of missiles and 
vehicle delivery systems.59   Among these, North Korea has deployed more than three 
hundred No Dong – “x” medium-range missiles able to hit the main Japanese Islands and 
Okinawa, and close to one thousand short-range SCUD B and C missiles which are able 
to hit South Korea and which are equipped to carry chemical warheads.60   The DPRK’s 
No Dong 1 and 2 missiles have a range of 1,300 to 2,000 km.  In addition, North Korea is 
believed to have Taepo Dong – “x” and “2” ICBMs, which, at a maximum range of 6,200 
miles, could reach as far East as Chicago, Illinois.61    
The DPRK also has a highly trained Special Operations Force (SOF) made 
up of 22 brigades and 7 independent battalions that have five basic missions: conducting 
reconnaissance, performing combat operations in concert with conventional operations, 
establishing a second front in the enemy's rear area, countering the Combined Forces 
Command special operations in North Korean rear areas, and maintaining internal 
security.62 North Korea classifies its special operations units as reconnaissance, light 
infantry, or sniper. 63 
 
b. NAVY (NKN) 
In the past, the North Korean Navy has primarily been a coastal defense 
force.  In 1992, the brown-water navy was also capable of “conducting inshore defensive 
operations, submarine operations against merchant shipping and unsophisticated naval 
combatants, offensive and defensive mining operations, and conventional raids.”64 
Current estimates put North Korea's fleet at approximately 430 combat 
vessels (Patrol craft, guided missile boats, torpedo boats, fire support craft), 40 
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submarines (15 midgets), and 340 support craft (landing craft, hovercraft).65  As with the 
ground forces, 60% of the vessels are stationed near the demarcation line.66  
The NKN's most capable weapons system is the guided-missile patrol boat 
– approximately 43 in the fleet – equipped with the SS-N-2A STYX antiship missile.67  
Though they are small and limited to coastal operations or calm seas, they have a 
capability to quickly respond to Combined Forces Command (CFC) shipping 
approaching the coast. 68 The Navy has 19 fast-attack missile craft.  In addition it has 12 
OSA-1 guided-missile patrol boats, and 10 DPRK versions called the SOJU, which are 
all equipped with four CSS-N-1 missile launchers.  Their missiles have a maximum range 
of 25 nautical miles and carry radar or infrared homing seekers.69 
While the navy seldom operates outside the North Korean military 
exclusion zone (extending about fifty kilometers off North Korea's coast), the navy has 
conducted numerous submarine and other seaborne infiltration attempts into South 
Korea.  In addition, clashes with the South Korean navy, and harassment of South Korean 
fishing boats, such as a week-long confrontation in June 1999, occur to this day.70 
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c. AIR FORCE (KNAF) 
The DPRK’s Air Force consists of six divisions (103,000); 3 for combat 
(fighter/bomber regiments), 2 for transport and helicopter, and one devoted exclusively 
for training; and 92,000 personnel.71  Although DPRK air-bases are located throughout 
the country, the majority are in the southern provinces.  In the event of a ground attack on 
its aircraft, Pyongyang has the capability to protect combat air-craft in hardened 
shelters.72   
Most of the KNA’s 1670 aircraft are obsolete, with only sixty modern 
aircraft (MiG-23, 29).  Most are old Soviet aircraft (MiG-19, MiG-21, IL-28, SU-7, SU-
25) and about 320 can be considered “ancient” (MiG-15, MiG-17).  According to 
estimates 820 are support aircraft and helicopters.73 Of most concern, however, is the 
“300 AN-2.”  Flying at 100 mph at low altitudes, radar detection is very difficult, and its 
“transport of Special Forces troopers deep behind the lines is a very definite threat.”74 
2. 
                                                
Chemical and Biological Weapons 
Although North Korea signed the Biological Weapons Convention in 1987, it has 
been identified as a “leading violator of the international treaty that bans germ warfare.” 
In 1994, the DPRK had an estimated 250 tons of biological and chemical weapons.75 
As of 2002, according to South Korea’s Defense Ministry, North Korea has a 
stockpile of 2,500 to 5,000 tons of chemical weapons including nerve, blister and choking 
agents.  In addition to this reserve, officials believe the DPRK is capable of producing 
about 4,500 tons of chemical weapons every year.  By comparison, Russia had 40,000 
tons of chemical weapons when the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty went into 
effect, and the United States had 30,000 tons before it began to dismantle its reserves.  
Pyongyang's army also has biological weapons.  Information was released in the 
early 1990s that indicated applied military biotechnology work was going on at numerous 
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North Korean medical institutes and universities dealing with pathogens such as anthrax, 
cholera, and plague. 76  It is now believed that there are at least 13 different lethal germs 
and viruses in their bio-weapons arsenal.77    
The DPRK is capable of adding approximately 1 ton of biological weapons to 
their stockpile annually.  According to John Bolton, U.S. Undersecretary of State for 
arms control and international security, the U.S. government believes that “North Korea 
has one of the most robust offensive bioweapons programs on earth."78  Just as with their 
chemical agents, North Korea has a munitions production infrastructure which enables 
the weaponization of agents.  It is possible that the DPRK already has biological weapons 
available for military use.79 
The simple production of a biochemical agent does not always translate into an 
effective chemical or biological weapon however; its effectiveness also depends on 
quality of production, means of dispersal and intended target. The fact that North Korea 
has produced and deployed long-range ballistic missiles and that these missiles are 
capable of reaching the United States, coupled with the fact that the missiles can be fitted 
with biochemical warheads, make these weapons a serious threat. 80  As a matter of fact, 
the DPRK has at least 17 different types of vehicles that can be used to dispense nerve 
gases.81  These vehicles include ballistic missiles, aircraft, artillery projectiles and other 
unconventional weapons.82  
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3. 
                                                
Nuclear Weapons 
The North Korean nuclear program began during the Cold War as a “response to a 
security challenge – dealing with United States’ and, potentially, South Korean nuclear 
threats without being able to count on the consistent support of either China or the Soviet 
Union.”83  After the Korean War, Kim Il Sung asked China for assistance in developing a 
nuclear weapons program.  After making several requests - all of which were denied, the 
DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, like its national ideology, became “self-reliant.”84  
Among the members of its group of nuclear weapons designers were an engineer, a 
chemist, and physicist from the pre-Korean-War South; and two North Koreans who 
were trained in nuclear physics at Moscow University.85   
In 1982, U.S. intelligence sources identified the construction of what would 
become a 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon.  Concerned, U.S. leaders urged 
Moscow to intervene, and to convince North Korean officials to sign the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  In 1985, Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko agreed to 
provide four light water reactors if North Korea joined the NPT.  In 1986 however, 
evidence of detonations on the riverbanks near Yongbyon, led to the conclusion that the 
reactor was being used for development of nuclear weapons.  In 1987 the construction of 
what seemed to be a plutonium reprocessing plant was discovered and reinforced these 
suspicions.86   
The North Koreans’ drive for nuclear weapons continued as construction began 
on a second and far more powerful reactor in 1988.  Despite the signed NPT agreement, 
North Korea refused to let International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors into 
the country as long as the U.S. had nuclear weapons in place in South Korea  – an 
argument that the U.S. found difficult to deal with until the end of the Cold War.87  
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As of 2002, the Central Intelligence Agency estimates that North Korea has two 
nuclear weapons and, if it reprocesses its stockpile of spent nuclear fuel into weapons-
grade plutonium, could build five or six more in a six-month period.88  This thesis will 
explore North Korean nuclear proliferation issues more thoroughly in Chapter 4.     
  
E. A TOOL FOR PROFIT 
Although the North Korean quest for legitimacy was a driving force, it was not an 
end in itself.  Not by accident, the Juché-based relationships that the DPRK formed with 
the non-aligned states became very beneficial financially.  In the mid-1970s and 1980s, 
The DPRK became a significant actor in international arms trafficking.  According to 
estimates by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) between 1981 
and 1989, mostly in trade for oil with Iran for the Iran-Iraq war, North Korea exported 
almost $4 billion in weaponry.89  This weaponry accounted for as much as 40 percent of 
all Iranian arms imports during the war with Iraq.90  North Korea also sold Chinese 
missiles and SCUD rockets to the Middle East.91 
In the early 1970s, in further attempts to “gain legitimacy” in the international 
community, the DPRK began trading with non-communist countries such as Japan, 
Sweden and numerous others in Western Europe.  In fact, Pyongyang incurred billions of 
dollars worth of debt resulting from massive purchases of capital goods.  It appeared that 
North Korean leaders were making a serious effort to become global trading partners.   
When the ideas of the “Nixon Doctrine” were announced in mid-1969, that 
indicated that “Asians should provide the manpower for their own wars – the United 
States appeared to be moving toward disengagement.”92  As tensions about North Korea 
eased, and in keeping with the “Doctrine,” the administration withdrew a division of 
United States soldiers from South Korea.  In response, North Korea virtually halted their 
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attempts at infiltration and significantly reduced the defense budget in 1971.  Soon after, 
in 1972, the Koreas held high-level talks.  These talks between the director of the ROK’s 
Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP) commonly referred to as the “Korean 
CIA,” and Kim Il Sung's younger brother, Kim Young Ju, resulted in President Park 
Chung Hee's July fourth announcement that both sides would seek peaceful 
reunification.93  In keeping with Juché principles, they agreed that this transition would 
take place peacefully, independent of outside forces, and with the intention of creating a 
“national unity.”94  
In the late 1970s, when Carter began talking of withdrawing U.S. forces from the 
peninsula Kim Il Sung, excited about the prospect of a unified Korea (but more so for 
financial reasons), turned to the United States.   Kim promised that he was “knocking on 
the American door, wanted diplomatic relations and trade, and would not interfere with 
American business interests in the South once Korea was reunified.”95  Kim even went so 
far as to refer to Carter as “a man of justice.”96  At the same time, North Korea’s rapid 
and extensive upgrade of its army was discovered and talks fell apart.  In the meantime, 
the prices of North Korea's natural resources, specifically minerals, declined sharply 
because of a worldwide recession that lowered demand. Combined with a sharp decline 
in foreign exchange reserves, North Korea was left further in a debt crisis.  After first 
suspending, and then attempting to reschedule payments, North Korea defaulted on its 
foreign debt payment.97 
Because of this default, and because of the recently de-railed relationship with the 
United States, the North Koreans found it increasingly difficult to obtain credit from the 
West and were forced again to look to the NAM for help.  Under these circumstances 
Kim appealed to the NAM when he said, “The present situation urgently demands that 
the non-aligned countries wage the struggle to establish a new international economic 
order by achieving economic independence and realizing south-south cooperation, along 
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with the struggle to check and frustrate the aggressive and belligerent policy of the 
imperialists and preserve peace and security in the world.”98 
In the late 1980s Pyongyang turned again to the Soviet Union.  Kim Il Sung 
visited Moscow twice and, in return, the Soviets upgraded the North Korean Air Force 
with Mig 23s.99  In keeping with the Sino-Soviet tug-of-war China, having developed 
relations with the United States, intervened in order to “reduce tensions in Korea.”  As a 
result of careful posturing with the Soviets and China, by the end of the Cold War, the 
DPRK was conducting almost 83 percent of its total trade with its largest creditors: the 
Soviet Union, China, and with a new trading partner – Japan.100  It was under these 
economic circumstances that the North Koreans entered the post-Cold War environment. 
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IV. ECONOMIC TERRORISM: THE DPRK’S POST-COLD WAR 
STRATAGEM FOR ECONOMIC GAIN 
Armed with a sufficient arsenal to both export and use to their own ends, 
North Korea could soon be blackmailing South Korea, Japan and even the 
United States into providing sufficient aid and diplomatic concessions in 
order to sustain their crumbling regime and earning hard currency from its 
nuclear sales abroad. 
      - Senator John McCain - 1994101 
 
At the end of the Cold War the Soviet Union and the PRC, the DPRK’s greatest 
benefactors, began to look toward the West for diplomatic and economic inclusion.  Not 
only did they turn away from the DPRK but also, adding insult to injury, each developed 
somewhat normal relations with South Korea.  The DPRK’s failing economy 
compounded by a series of natural disasters left North Korea desperate for economic and 
humanitarian aid, but with a regime that was steadfast in its “self-reliant” ideology.   
The regime clearly fears that reforming the economy will bring an influx of new 
ideas and cultural influences that will erode its authority.102 Thus the DPRK’s leaders 
had to develop a way to receive the aid they need, while minimizing external influences.  
The result is a system, devised by Kim Il Sung and perpetuated by his son, that can be 
called “economic terrorism”; a series of threats followed by demands for monetary 
compensation.   
A.  SHIFT TOWARD THE WEST 
The Soviet Union had economic problems of its own, so it began reaching out to 
South Korea among others for trade even before the end of the Cold War.  When he 
became aware that the Soviets’ were developing relations with the ROK, Kim Il Jong 
demanded an explanation.  The new Soviet policy became very clear in 1988 when the 
Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee responded frankly:  
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The USSR, to solve its economic problems, is interested in new partners.  
South Korea possesses technology and products that can be of use, 
especially in the Far Eastern regions of our state.  As is well known, South 
Korea maintains commercial links with almost all countries in the world, 
including such socialist states as the People’s Republic of China.  The 
opening up of direct economic contacts between the Soviet Union and 
South Korea will also benefit peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific 
region.103 
While the Soviets went on to say that they had no intention of rushing into these 
economic ties, nor developing political ones with South Korea, Pyongyang’s trust was 
betrayed.   
As previously discussed, the relationship between China and North Korea was 
historically based and very close.  Even after a shift in Beijing’s foreign policy in 1971-
1972, Chinese leaders maintained close ties with the DPRK.  The Chinese viewed North 
Korea as an “important ideological client and ally on China’s border.”104  Kim Il Sung 
gave a vivid description of DPRK-China relations when he called it, “an invincible force 
that no one can ever break…It will last as long as the mountains and rivers to (sic) the 
two countries exist.”105 
However, by 1990 Beijing was conducting seven times more trade with South 
Korea than it was with the North.106  This amount of trade called for increased relations 
on the political front.  China saw increased diplomatic relations with the ROK as an 
internal political victory; believing that the ROK would be forced to end its official 
support of Taiwan.  Also, since the Sino-Soviet dispute ended with the Cold War, China 
was no longer concerned about pushing North Korea away toward the Soviets.   
In 1991, much like the Soviet policy announcement, China dealt the DPRK a 
severe blow when, despite North Korea’s opposition, it refused to veto South Korea’s 
entry into the United Nations.107  Even worse, China had been the DPRK’s only hope of 
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preventing the ROK’s admission since Gorbachev had already pledged his support to 
Seoul. The loss of Pyongyang’s closest allies simply reinforced to Kim Jong Il the 
necessity of Juché.  The DPRK was forced to look internally for ways to provide physical 
protection, to generate revenue, and to make itself known to the international community.  
   
B. NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
The North Korean quest for aid in building a nuclear program began in response 
to nuclear threats from the United States and South Korea.  During the Korean War, 
whether or not it would have, the United States threatened to use nuclear weapons on 
North Korea.  After the war, the United States positioned tactical nuclear weapons on the 
peninsula.  In spite of the fact that the United States pledged to keep South Korea under 
the nuclear umbrella, President Park of South Korea wanted to neutralize the 
conventional threat from the North and build its own nuclear program.  In response to the 
Nixon Doctrine’s requirement that regional states take increased responsibility for their 
security, South Korea (until the United States quashed the idea) began discussions with 
the French to obtain a reprocessing facility.108   
After the Korean War, Kim Il Sung asked China and the Soviet Union for 
assistance in developing a nuclear weapons program of its own.  In 1964, after China had 
successfully tested its atomic bomb, Kim Il Sung sent a delegation to ask China to help 
its little brother for assistance in developing a nuclear program.  The Chinese denied this 
request on the basis that the program would be too costly and was not necessary since 
North Korea was such a small country.109  In 1974, after the DPRK’s weapons program 
had begun, North Korea made a second request for aid from China.  This request was also 
refused.110  
In the meantime, the DPRK made several requests for aid from the Soviet Union.  
In 1965, the Soviets refused to assist Pyongyang in providing nuclear weapons 
technology, but agreed to assist the North in developing a peaceful nuclear energy 
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program for electric power generation – a research reactor at Yongbyon.111  The Soviets 
provided this reactor under the condition that it be monitored by the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA).112 In addition, the Soviets agreed to train North Koreans in 
nuclear engineering at Soviet universities. 
Precisely when the North Koreans began to build the Soviet-backed facility is not 
known.  As early as 1982, however, U.S. intelligence sources identified the construction 
of the 5-megawatt nuclear reactor at Yongbyon that would be capable of producing 
enough plutonium for up to six weapons per year.113  In 1985, at the behest of 
Washington, Soviet leader Konstantin Chernenko agreed to provide four light water 
reactors if North Korea joined the NPT, which they did in December, 1985.114  
To further the goal of non-proliferation and as a confidence-building 
measure between States (sic) parties, the Treaty establishes a safeguards 
system under the responsibility of the IAEA. Safeguards are used to verify 
compliance with the Treaty through inspections conducted by the IAEA. 
The Treaty promotes cooperation in the field of peaceful nuclear 
technology and equal access to this technology for all States (sic) parties, 
while safeguards prevent the diversion of fissile material for weapons 
use.115  
By 1987, North Korean officials had still not completed documentation of the 
country’s facilities.  The situation was compounded by a mistake in documentation by the 
IAEA.  The IAEA had provided incorrect documents “relating to inspections of specific 
sites rather than general facilities.”116      
Despite his endorsement of the agreement, apparently Kim Il Sung had no 
intention of terminating his indigenous nuclear program.  Between 1983 and 1987, near 
the site of the reactor, evidence of nuclear detonations were discovered on the riverbanks, 
which led to the conclusion that the reactor there was being used for development of 
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nuclear weapons.117  In 1987 the construction of what seemed to be a plutonium 
reprocessing plant was discovered and reinforced these suspicions.118  
The North Korean drive for nuclear weapons continued as construction began on 
a second and far more powerful 50 megawatt reactor in 1987, which was rumored to be 
able to produce enough plutonium for up to 30 weapons per year.119 Adding to the 
severity of the situation 1989, the containment vessel of the Yongbyon reactor was shut 
down long enough, by CIA estimates, for four thousand fuel rods to be replaced.  The 
spent fuel rods would yield enough plutonium for one, or maybe two nuclear bombs.120  
Despite the signed NPT agreement, North Korean officials refused to let the 
IAEA inspectors into the country.  Part of their rationale was an extension granted to the 
DPRK because of paperwork issues – the fault of the IAEA.  There is little evidence 
however that the DPRK planned to let inspectors into the country.  Relations between the 
DPRK and the Soviet Union were waning.  The Soviets’ had growing economic 
difficulties, so it seemed that production of the light water reactors (the reason the DPRK 
signed the treaty in the first place) would never come to fruition.121    
Another reason the Kim regime refused to allow inspectors into the country, or to 
stop its attempts at nuclear proliferation was because the U.S. had nuclear weapons in 
place in South Korea  – an argument that the U.S. found difficult to counter until the end 
of the Cold War.  Partially in response to the DPRK’s nuclear proliferation, in 1991 
President George H. W. Bush announced the removal of all ground and sea-based tactical 
nuclear weapons from the peninsula.122   Although the United States still promised to 
provide an umbrella of nuclear protection for South Korea,123 Bush also decided “to 
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permit North Koreans to inspect the U.S. base at Kunsan where the nuclear weapons had 
been stored, to meet another of North Korea’s demands.”124   
While the United States’ policy of nuclear weapons retraction was not limited to 
the Korean peninsula, Kim Il Sung viewed this move as a United States concession to its 
demands.  In this environment, the DPRK agreed to the “December Accords” with South 
Korea which resulted in the “Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonagression and Exchanges 
and Cooperation between the South and the North,” also known as the “Basic 
Agreement.”   
Although the Basic Agreement did not address nuclear issues, several days later, 
the “Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” was negotiated 
and entered into force in February 1992.  Under this nuclear accord, Seoul and 
Pyongyang “pledged not to ‘test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store, deploy or 
use nuclear weapons’ and not to “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment 
facilities.” In addition, they agreed to reciprocal inspections to be arranged and 
implemented by a Joint Nuclear Control Commission.” 125 The motivation behind the 
agreement became obvious in March 1992, when the IAEA director visited North Korea 
for the first time.  Kim Il Sung promised to abandon his nuclear reprocessing efforts...in 
return for light water reactors.126   
It was not long after that the United States realized that Pyongyang was less than 
forthcoming with information related to its nuclear activities.  In May the DPRK 
announced to the IAEA that it had produced 90 grams of plutonium experimentally.127  
After initial inspections the IAEA found that a random sample of nuclear waste did not 
match any of the disclosed separated plutonium, and concluded that more plutonium was 
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produced.128  From this and other information, U.S. intelligence sources believed North 
Korea had enough plutonium for possibly two weapons.129  
In December 1992, IAEA director Hans Blix requested inspections of two 
undeclared nuclear-related sites that intelligence reports had identified as nuclear waste 
sites.130  North Korean officials refused to permit the IAEA to conduct the inspections, as 
per the NPT, stating that an inspection of “non-nuclear military facilities ‘might 
jeopardize the supreme interests’ of the DPRK.”131  Director Blix met with North Korean 
officials in Vienna where he stated that for the first time in its history, the IAEA was 
prepared to initiate a “special inspection” which would be attempted despite North 
Korean objections.132  The DPRK’s continued refusal to allow IAEA inspectors into 
these two sites marked the beginning of a crisis on the peninsula, unparalleled since the 
Korean War.  
 
C. CRISIS OF 1994: ADVENT OF THE AGREED FRAMEWORK AND 
KEDO 
 
1. The Pre-Crisis 
In February, 1993 the IAEA’s continued insistence upon inspecting the DPRK’s 
suspected nuclear waste sites, led North Korea to announce its intention to withdraw from 
the NPT. 133  In response, the IAEA declared a formal censure on North Korea and 
referred Pyongyang’s violations to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).134  In 
May, the UNSC passed a resolution asking North Korea to allow IAEA inspections, but 
                                                 
128 Ibid. 
129 Ibid. 
130 Oberdorfer, 276 
131 Ibid. 
132 “Congressional Record - Senate Resolution 92—Relating to North Korea’s Proposed Withdrawal 
from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,” Senate - April 02, 1993, Federation of 
American Scientists [online] < http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/congress/1993/s930402-dprk.htm>   
133 Congressional Record “McCain (and others) amendment No. 1331.”   
134 Ibid. 
35
Pyongyang rejected this request and continued to refuse IAEA personnel access to any of 
its sites.135   
The UNSC then prepared to seek sanctions against North Korea.  Under Chapter 7 
of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council’s options ranged from severing 
diplomatic relations and communication lines, to taking military action.136  Before they 
could impose sanctions, however, the DPRK announced that it was ready to initiate talks 
with the United States.137 
The June negotiations were attended by Robert Gallucci, the U.S. Assistant 
Secretary of State for politico-military affairs, and Kang Sok Ju, the DPRK’s Deputy 
Foreign Minister, and focused on what security assurances the United States could 
provide in return for a decision by North Korea to remain in the NPT. On the eve of the 
North Koreans’ threatened withdrawal, an agreement was made to continue official 
dialogue, to provide security assurances by the U.S. to the DPRK, and in return, the 
DPRK would remain in the NPT. 138   
In July 1993, Pyongyang offered to give up their nuclear program if the 
international community would provide LWRs.  The expense involved in such an 
endeavor, coupled with the fact that more energy could be produced using non-nuclear 
fuels, made the suggestion seem ludicrous.  However, the Clinton administration 
acknowledged the offer and agreed to consider it, as long as Pyongyang agreed to 
cooperate with the IAEA.139  
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2. The Crisis of 1994 
Talks between the United States and North Korea continued until January 1994, 
when Under Secretary of State Lynn Davis announced that “North Korea agreed to 
inspections of seven declared nuclear-related sites.”140  By March, however, the North 
Koreans would still not permit the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to 
conduct essential activities during its inspection.  Under the NPT’s Safeguards 
Agreement, the DPRK had two major responsibilities.  First, Pyongyang was obliged to 
allow IAEA inspectors freedom to verify that all its nuclear activities have been duly 
declared.  Second, the DPRK must show that that none of their nuclear activities have 
been used for the production or development of nuclear weapons.141   
The importance of the inspections, was to alleviate the ambiguity in intelligence 
reports about how much plutonium the DPRK could have processed from the reactor.  If 
the IAEA were allowed to sample rods from the reactor core, they could identify how 
many fuel rods were removed and identify how much plutonium may have been 
produced.142  Since the Agency was unable to certify that the North was not diverting or 
producing nuclear material for non-peaceful purposes, the IAEA’s Board then officially 
concluded that the DPRK was in non-compliance.143  While the DPRK withdrew its 
membership from the IAEA, its obligations under the safeguards agreement remained 
“binding, and in force.”144 
 The North threatened again to withdraw from the NPT.  North-South Korean 
relations were halted, and tensions ran high on the Korean Peninsula, as the confrontation 
between North Korea and the United States deepened.  The United States’ main 
objectives were to have North Korea fully comply with its obligations under the NPT and 
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to ensure a de-nuclearized Korean peninsula. This objective was presented to Congress, 
as were the concessions that the United States was willing to make to North Korea.   
The United States must clearly communicate its firm resolve to compel 
North Korea to comply with the inspections required under the NPT and 
has instead offered to cancel 1994 Team Spirit joint military exercises 
with South Korea; indications are that numerous other concessions, such 
as diplomatic recognition and economic assistance, are also being 
considered.145 
Again diplomatic avenues were taken, and the matter was referred to the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC).  Again, the Council threatened sanctions against the 
DPRK.  This time, however, Pyongyang responded by stating that it would consider the 
imposing of sanctions, as a “declaration of war.”146   
Tensions continued to rise, and military leaders prepared for armed conflict.  The 
United States-South Korean Joint Operations Command devised “Operations Plan 5027,” 
which provided U.S. troop reinforcements to the Republic of Korea in the event of 
“external armed attack.”147  Offensively, in response to the North Korean SCUD missile 
threat, the Joint ROK –U.S. Defense Commander had Patriot missiles deployed to the 
peninsula to “deter the threat of offensive weapons.”148  Several military strategies were 
put on the table before the Clinton administration, including destruction of the Yongbyon 
nuclear facility.  Finally, in the event that the UNSC imposed sanctions, the U.S. Armed 
Forces made preparations to deploy additional troops to South Korea.149 
To make matters worse, North Korea began removing spent fuel from its 5-
megawatt reactor, and announced that they were expelling IAEA inspectors who were 
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monitoring the fuel to prevent its use for bomb production.150  Things looked dismal for a 
peaceful resolution to the crisis. 
3. The Carter Conference 
Former President Jimmy Carter, concerned about the growing potential for 
military conflict, contacted President Clinton.  The President agreed to send Robert 
Gallucci to fully brief Mr. Carter on the North Korea situation.  After confirming the 
seriousness of the circumstances, Mr. Carter notified the President of his intentions to 
visit Pyongyang.151  Before the visit, National Security Advisor Anthony Lake informed 
the former President that his official capacity was limited – that he was to go, as Carter 
described later, “‘without any clear instructions or official endorsement.’”152 
During the visit, Kim Il Sung stated he was willing to freeze the DPRK’s nuclear 
program; to allow the inspectors to remain in place, and continue monitoring; and to 
discuss dismantling the reactors and reprocessing plant, if their aged reactors could be 
replaced with modern and safer ones.  Kim’s one other request was for a ‘U.S. guarantee 
that there will be no nuclear attack against his country.’”153  
Jimmy Carter believed he had achieved “everything we needed,” but the 
administration was not as impressed with the results of the meetings.154  Mr. Carter had 
simply gotten a series of general promises from Kim.  In addition, he had promised that 
the United States would provide a package of benefits in return.  Not only were important 
details missing from the agreement, there was some question as to the sincerity of Kim’s 
administration actually initiating a freeze.  For example, when Mr. Carter met with First 
Deputy Foreign Minister Kang Sok Ju to confirm the freeze, Kang “tended to deviate in 
his position from what Kim Il Sung had committed to do.”  It was not until the former 
President asked him if he “had a different policy from his 'Great Leader,'” that he would 
back down.155 
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 What appeared to some as an immediate fix to dire straits, however, was met 
with quite a bit of criticism from others, including the Clinton administration.156  Based 
solely on Kim’s general assurances, Carter appeared live via CNN, boasting of his 
accomplishments at the same time condemning the United States’ hard-lined position.  
Not only did he condemn the proposed sanctions, he flat-out misrepresented fact when he 
stated that the Clinton administration had “stopped the sanctions activity in the United 
Nations.”157  
Despite single-handedly destroying President Clinton’s North Korean foreign 
policy, the former President made what some see as major accomplishments.  Without 
providing details, he promised that the United States would reward North Korea for 
ceasing its nuclear program.  He also paved the way for renewed South-North talks.  
Unfortunately, Kim Il Sung died suddenly of a heart attack on July 8, 1994, halting plans 
for a first ever South-North presidential summit, and turning leadership over to his son 
Kim Jong Il.158   
While relations quickly deteriorated between North and South Korea, the United 
States continued to press forward with talks.  In August, an “Agreed Statement” between 
the U.S and the DPRK outlined the commitments each was willing to make.  In addition 
to addressing the nuclear issue, the two participants agreed to “establish diplomatic 
representation in each other’s capitals and reduce barriers to trade and investment, as a 
move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.”159  Finally, an 
“Agreed Framework” was signed between the U.S. and North Korea, ending the series of 
negotiations, which had lasted for almost two years.160 
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4. The Agreement161 
On October 21, 1994, in Geneva Switzerland, North Korea and the U.S. signed a 
four-page Agreed Framework.  The agreement contained four provisions.  The first 
provision states that the United States was to head an international consortium to replace 
North Korea’s graphite reactors with light water reactors capable of generating 2,000 
megawatts of energy.  Under this provision, the project was to be initiated immediately 
upon signing and was to be completed by 2003.  The United States pledged to offset 
proposed energy shortages by supplying 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually to the DPRK.  
In return for these concessions, the DPRK pledged to freeze its graphite reactors and 
related facilities.  During the freeze the DPRK was to allow the IAEA to monitor the 
freeze, and promised to fully cooperate with the monitors.  In addition, North Korea was 
to dismantle its reactors and related facilities upon completion of the LWRs.  Very 
importantly, the United States and the DPRK were to work together to store previously 
spent fuel during the LWR project, and to dispose of that fuel to prevent its reprocessing 
by the DPRK.   
The second provision set up by the agreement was for the United States and North 
Korea to work toward normalization of political and economic relations.   Both sides 
agreed to drop barriers to trade, to open liaison offices in each’s capitals and to eventually 
“upgrade bilateral relations to the ambassadorial level.”  
The third provision makes assurances for peace and security on the Korean 
Peninsula.  First, the United States was to formally assure the DPRK that nuclear 
weapons would not be used against it.  Second, the DPRK would consistently implement 
the “North-South Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.”  
Third, the DPRK was to conduct North – South dialogue under the new spirit of peace 
and cooperation promoted by the Agreed Framework.   
Finally, the fourth provision set up the future of the DPRK in the Non-
proliferation Treaty.  The DPRK pledged to remain a part of the treaty and to allow 
implementation of the safeguards set forth in the NPT.  The DPRK also agreed to have 
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the IAEA conduct routine inspections of facilities not covered under the freeze.  And 
finally, once a significant portion of the reactor was completed, before the critical nuclear 
components were to be delivered, the DPRK was to provide full disclosure of, and to be 
subject to an IAEA inspection verifying all nuclear material in the DPRK. 
Due to the sheer value of the concessions made by the United States through the 
Agreed Framework, communist North Korea rose to first place as the recipient of the 
most U.S. aid in Asia.162   In return, while the DPRK appeared forthcoming with its 
promises and disclosures during the drafting of the agreement, it would not take long 
before the motives and sincerity with which the DPRK entered into this unparalleled 
agreement, would seriously come into question. 
5. Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) 
In support of the goals set forth by the Agreed Framework, KEDO was 
established on March 15, 1995.  The United States, Japan, and the Republic of Korea 
(ROK), signed the Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development Organization to manage the issues of the LWRs and fuel-oil.   
In June officials met to discuss the details of the project, and it appeared as the 
project got underway that things would go smoothly.  Even when North Korean officials 
found out that the South Korean Electric Power Corporation was the prime contractor for 
the reactor project, the North Korean Foreign Minister, Kim Young-nam, shrugged it off 
saying, “What KEDO does is the internal matter of the United States and we do not feel it 
is necessary to interfere and do not care a bit.”163 
Before work on the LWR project could even begin, however, issues continued to 
arise which seriously delayed the construction of the reactors.  The more serious 
problems began on September 18, 1996 when a North Korean spy submarine came 
aground on the shores of South Korea.  More than twenty commandos came ashore, 
eleven of whom apparently killed each other to avoid capture and several of whom were 
killed by South Korean authorities.164  In response, South Korea demanded that the North 
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apologize for the situation and make assurances that it would not happen again.  If 
Pyongyang did not, Seoul threatened, the KEDO program would be suspended – as 
would all other forms of aid.165   The situation worsened when South Korea postponed 
the arrival of KEDO project construction workers to North Korea until the safety of all 
workers was guaranteed by the DPRK.  The DPRK then accused the United States and 
the ROK of breaking the Agreed Framework and threatened to re-start its nuclear 
program.  Finally, in January after weeks of negotiations, the DPRK expressed “deep 
regret” for the situation and vowed to prevent further incidents.166   
While the submarine incident was heating up, in October 1996, based on a report 
by Hans Blix, director general of the IAEA, that North Korea and Iraq were not allowing 
inspectors sufficient access to their nuclear programs, the UN General Assembly passed a 
resolution urging both to comply with the safeguards agreement.167    
Finally a groundbreaking ceremony was held on August 19, 1997 and things 
again appeared to be on track for the LWR program.  Since then, the DPRK has 
continued to take actions that have halted work on the reactors and have prevented 
completion of the project. Mi Ae Geoum, Public Affairs Officer for KEDO outlines some 
of the delays that KEDO has experienced during construction: 
The LWR project is a complex and unprecedented engineering project. Its 
implementation has been affected by a variety of factors. The most 
dramatic incident was the DPRK test launch of a Taepo Dong missile in 
1998. At that time, KEDO suspended all LWR activities for four months, 
until the DPRK Government apologized for the incident.  In the course of 
nearly eight years, KEDO has also experienced delays during negotiations 
with the DPRK government in establishing technical policies and 
procedures, particularly on the supply of laborers at the construction 
site.168   
“Apart from DPRK interventions,” Geoum states that other construction – related 
issues often present in an engineering project of this magnitude have contributed to 
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delays in the completion of the project, such as “the change of the vendor of the steam 
turbines and generators since the Turnkey contract for the Light-Water Reactor project 
went into effect in February 2000.”169  “The completion of the project,” she effectively 
points out, “ultimately depends on the timely fulfillment of commitments on both sides.” 
 
D. TAEPO DONG INCIDENT 
On April 17, 1998, the U.S. Department of State announced sanctions against 
North Korea for violating the Arms Export Control Chapter of US Code, Title 22 and the 
Export Administration Act of 1979 by engaging in missile technology proliferation.170  
Two months later, despite warnings from the United States, North Korea declared its 
intention to continue to develop, test, and deploy missiles. 171  Pyongyang insisted that 
the development was both a means of countering a perceived U.S. military threat, and a 
means of generating foreign currency. 172  North Korean officials stated, if the United 
States was concerned about North Korean missiles, that the DPRK would terminate 
missile sales if the U.S. would lift its economic embargo, and would compensate the 
DPRK $500 million annually for lost profits. 173   
On August 31, North Korea test-fired a missile over Japan, and again it appeared 
that North Korea was looking for economic gain.  During the test-fire, the first stage of 
the rocket separated 300km east of the launch site. The second stage continued over the 
main Japanese Island, Honshu, and crashed into the Pacific Ocean 330km east of the 
Japanese city of Hachinohe.  Although there was a third stage, it failed, making the total 
distance that the missile traveled approximately 1,380km.174 
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North Korea claimed that it launched the multistage rocket, and successfully put a 
satellite into orbit for the “peaceful exploration of space.” 175  While the satellite did not 
make it into orbit, it was the launch itself that infuriated the United States and Japan for 
several reasons.  First was a simple issue of safety.  The DPRK had conducted the test-
launch without prior notification to the International Civil Aviation Organization, and the 
launch area affected 180 daily flights between North America and Asia.176  
Another concern was related to the technology of the missile itself and the threat 
that it posed to the international community.  The U.S. had anticipated a test-launch, but 
the presence of a third-stage was a surprise.177  The test-flight also allowed the North 
Koreans to prove their ability to fire a Medium Range ICBM with multi-stage separation.  
This meant that the DPRK now had the ability to deliver several hundred-kilogram 
payloads about two thousand kilometers, posing “a threat to U.S. allies and interests in 
the region.” 178  Although the third-stage failed during the test-flight, when the North 
Koreans resolved the cause of the failure, they would be able to use the three-stage 
configuration as a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,500 km.  According to 
studies, if this third-stage technology were applied to the Taepo Dong-2 armed with a 
light payload, this missile could reach anywhere in the United States.179   
The final serious concern about the launch was that for a price, the Taepo Dong 
technology “could find its way into sensitive conflict zones with destabilizing 
consequences.”180  This fear was based on the fact that North Korea had formerly 
supplied Nodong technology to Iran and Pakistan, the latter of which directly resulted in 
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a nuclear arms race with India.  By its own admission, “exports [were] driving North 
Korean missile developments.”181   
In September, 1999 the United States and North Korea made a vaguely-worded 
agreement for a moratorium on missile launches, wherein the United States agreed to 
“suspend restrictions on certain categories of non-military trade, financial transactions, 
travel, and diplomatic contacts with North Korea.”  Secretary of Defense, William Perry 
noted that the U.S policy of “normalization of relations with Pyongyang was the best path 
for heading off North Korea's missile and nuclear programs.”182   
In February 2000, however, a Central Intelligence Agency official in charge of 
strategic and nuclear issues reportedly told members of Congress that North Korea 
appeared to be “continuing its ballistic missile program and selling technology to other 
nations despite a well-publicized [and self imposed] testing moratorium.”183  As this 
thesis will further discuss, the North Koreans kept a similar charade going with its 
nuclear weapons program. 
 
E. KUMCHANG-RI  
While Pyongyang was keeping the United States engaged in talks about missile 
proliferation, Kim Jong Il was engaged in other forms of “gamesmanship.”  In August 
1999, reports surfaced that spy satellites photographed an extensive work site at 
Kumchang-ri, 25 miles northeast of Yongbyon.  The photographs showed thousands of 
North Korean workers at the new site who appeared to be burrowing into the 
mountainside.184  Later, an underground facility was discovered that was suspected of 
being used for nuclear weapons development. 185   In response to the United States’ 
inquiry, a spokesman from the DPRK’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced that the 
DPRK decided to “allow a one-time visit to the Kumchang-ri project as an exception if 
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the United States gives the DPRK either 300 million U.S. dollars in cash or other 
economic benefit of an appropriate form equivalent to that amount in compensation for 
its slandering and insulting the DPRK.”186  The United States’ response was that “any 
compensation for the inspection of the facilities is unthinkable, but [the United States] 
can consider the support of food on the humanitarian standpoint if North Korea shows 
sincerity toward the inspection.”187   Under the final agreement the United States was to 
provide 601,000 tons of food to the DPRK.  Ultimately, the delegation did not find any 
evidence of weapons development at the facilities.   
In retrospect, it certainly was not a problem that the United States provided food 
aid to a country whose population was starving.  However, the problem lies in the 
circumstances under which the aid was supplied.  Once again, the United States made 
concessions under the threat of nuclear weapons development by North Korea – still a 
seemingly “rogue nation.” 
Once the Kumchang-ri issue was settled, officials from the United States and 
North Korea met in Pyongyang to discuss missile proliferation yet again.  The United 
States requested that the DPRK suspend the launch, development and exportation of 
missiles.  These talks failed, however, when North Korea again asked for financial 
compensation.188   
 
F. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: THE DISCLOSURE 
The most recent event in North Korea’s game of economic terrorism is its 
disclosure in October, 2002 that it has weapons of mass destruction.  According to the 
Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies, the most widely used definition 
of "weapons of mass destruction" in official U.S. documents is "nuclear, chemical, and 
biological weapons."  As discussed previously, North Korea has capabilities in all three 
of these areas.  What would provoke Kim’s regime to make this disclosure?  In this case, 
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many people are baffled by Kim Jong Il’s seemingly irrational actions.  While he has 
been called crazy; numerous sources have pointed out that he just might be “crazy like a 
fox.” 189   This thesis suggests that when the inspectors began to close in, instead of 
waiting to get caught, Kim Jong Il wanted to appear to have the upper hand.  
August 2002, saw the groundbreaking ceremony for the North Korean LWR 
facilities finally come to fruition.  At the ceremony, however, Ambassador Charles 
Pritchard, the U.S. representative to KEDO, requested some tangible progress by the 
DPRK.  According to a schedule provided to the DPRK, KEDO would complete a 
significant portion of the project and would deliver key nuclear components in mid-2005.  
According to the 1994 negotiations, before the deliveries would be made, the DPRK 
would have to come into full compliance with the IAEA safeguards agreement.190  The 
IAEA pointed out that even with full cooperation from the DPRK, it would take 3-4 years 
to “verify the completeness and correctness of North Korea's initial safeguards 
declaration.” 191  As such, the Ambassador insisted that the DPRK would have to begin 
immediate cooperation with the IAEA in order to reach the 2005 deadline.  
In September 2002, South Korean Foreign Minister Choi Sung-hong urged North 
Korea to allow inspections of its nuclear facilities.  He pointed out that the “proliferation 
of weapons of mass destruction" was a key challenge to the peace process between the 
Koreas.  Choi said in a statement to the UN General Assembly that, “It is now essential 
that the full cooperation with the International IAEA begin without further delay for the 
implementation of safeguards requirements.”192 
It was this continued pressure to comply with inspectors, which led the North 
Koreans to make a bold disclosure.  In early October 2002, the United States and North 
Korea met in Pyongyang for the first high-level talks in years.  James Kelly, assistant 
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secretary of state for Asian affairs met with Kang Suk Ju, “the equivalent of Kim’s right-
hand man.”193  During these talks, Kelly told officials that the United States knows North 
Korea has “‘different technology’ from that used prior to 1994,” referring to Uranium 
enrichment, and that it has generated “enough plutonium for at least two nuclear 
weapons.”  In response, Kang pointed out that President Bush had called the DPRK a 
member of the axis of evil, and that U.S. troops are deployed to the Korean peninsula, 
and said something akin to: “Of course, we have a nuclear program.”194   
  While the admission came as a surprise to the Bush administration, and to the 
American public, in retrospect it was probably the only thing that North Korea could do 
in the situation.  The DPRK did not comply with the safeguards agreements, and it was 
only a matter of time before inspectors verified the new nuclear program.  North Koreans 
had two choices; either get caught and have “egg on their faces,” or “save face” by 
making the admission in a casual statement and by blaming the United States.   
The timing of the disclosure was a key factor in the official response by the 
United States, or lack thereof.  Preoccupied with the same issue of WMD proliferation in 
Iraq, for days George W. Bush did not comment publicly on North Korea’s exposé.  
There was even some skepticism at first.  Was it possible that Kang Suk Ju had 
intentionally misled the United States, in order to gauge its response?195  Subsequent 
statements from Pyongyang urged the United States to conduct bilateral talks directly 
with North Korean officials. 
Since 1994, IAEA activities were limited to monitoring the "freeze" at Yongbyon.  
Accordingly, in October 2002, IAEA Director General, Dr. ElBaradei made it clear that 
the IAEA does not have a complete picture of the nuclear activities in the DPRK.196  
Ultimately, the Bush Administration concluded that the DPRK had violated the Agreed 
Framework (AF) and issued a statement that the United States would not hold talks 
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directly with Pyongyang.  On November 14, 2003, Secretary of State Colin Powell 
requested that KEDO stop shipments of fuel oil provided for under the AF.  KEDO 
agreed and made a statement that “North Korea must promptly eliminate its nuclear 
weapons program in a visible and verifiable manner.”  “Future shipments,” it said, “will 
depend on North Korea's concrete and credible actions to dismantle completely its highly 
enriched uranium program.”197   
Ironically, officials in Pyongyang accused the U.S. of violating the Agreed 
Framework.  In their typical showmanship style, they announced their intentions to restart 
their nuclear facilities.198  At the end of December, the IAEA reported that “seals have 
been cut and surveillance equipment impeded” at three facilities at the Yongbyong 
reactor “including the associated spent fuel pond, the fuel rod fabrication plant and the 
reprocessing facility.”199  IAEA spokesman Mark Gwozdecky, in a BBC interview, 
reported that inspectors watched North Koreans move 400 fresh fuel rods to the 
reactor.200 After they were allowed to observe these actions, on December 31, IAEA 
monitors were expelled from North Korea.   
Although the DPRK asserts that restarting the reactor is for energy producing 
purposes only, the 5 Megawatt reactor at Yongbyon would only produce enough 
electricity to power about five large American office buildings, less than that produced by 
the non-nuclear fuels provided by KEDO.  In contrast, if the DPRK cooperated fully with 
the construction of the LWRs, those reactors would produce 2,000 Megawatts of 
power.201  In light of these facts, there is little doubt that the DPRK intends to re-process 
the spent fuel rods for nuclear proliferation purposes.  On February 5, the North Koreans 
announced that they had resumed “normal operations” at Yongbyon.  While they still 
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insisted that the reactor was being used only to produce electricity, they added the 
vaguely threatening phrase “for the present stage.”202 In addition, the self-imposed 
moratorium on missile testing and launching was obviously suspended on February 25, 
2003 when the DPRK once again launched a missile into the Sea of Japan.  
Corresponding with the inauguration of the South Korean President, Roh Moo Hyun, the 
launch of the short-range “KN-01” anti-ship missile was seen as another attempt to 
increase tension over the North’s nuclear arms program.203 
So the question remains, what does North Korea want from this situation?  
Interviews with North Korean defectors, Eastern European diplomats, and people who 
know Kim Jong Il describe him as a “clever, ruthless leader who lives an opulent life and 
delights in geopolitical gamesmanship.”204  The scathing comments that President Bush 
has made about Kim Jong Il and his regime have certainly incited Kim to engage in this 
gamesmanship.  It is not unlikely that Kim enjoys watching President Bush lash out, and 
then back off, in response to his actions.   
In the worst-case scenario, the DPRK is preparing nuclear weapons with which to 
threaten the U.S. directly, or to sell to its adversaries.  In the best-case scenario, the 
DPRK wants to force the United States into normalizing relations, at the same time 
protecting itself from a nuclear threat.  Either way, this thesis argues that the current 
situation is similar to past situations spawned by Kim’s threats, and the reason is simple: 
the DPRK needs money.    
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V. U.S. POLICY RE NORTH KOREA: AIMS AND ATTEMPTS205 
A. THE GAMESMANSHIP OF KIM JONG IL 
Since the early nineties North Korean leaders attempted to deceive the world 
regarding their nuclear weapons production and capability.  They sat across treaty tables 
with the U.S. and its allies “selling” non-proliferation, all the while continuing to 
proliferate nuclear weapons.  The current Bush Administration has come under fire for 
being aggressively anti-North Korean,206 and is being blamed for strong North Korean 
reactions such as the re-start of the Yongbyon reactor.207  There is evidence, however, 
that the seemingly random and antagonistic actions and rhetoric which characterize North 
Korean policy are not new, but have been fairly consistent since the end of the Cold War.  
The North Korean regime has shown repeatedly that when it has financial need, it 
will make threats in order to procure funding in one form or another from the U.S.and its 
allies – thus engaging in what can be called economic terrorism.  These threats have 
included perpetuating suspicions of nuclear weapons development by: reneging on the 
Nonproliferation Treaty in 1993 and by refusing inspections at Kumchang-ri; launching 
the Taepo Dong missile over Japan in 1998; and most recently, admitting possession of 
WMD, restarting the reactor at Yongbyon and pulling out of the NPT. 
Another thing that remains constant is the timing of the DPRK’s threats.  These 
threats are made when the North Koreans perceive that their adversaries are at their most 
vulnerable.  Sometimes this means that tensions with North Korea are already 
dangerously high, other times it means that the adversary is preoccupied with other 
situations i.e. the U.S. with Iraq.   It is during these times that Pyongyang engages their 
negotiating strategy, what Peter Hayes, Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute for 
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Security and Sustainable Development, aptly describes as: “...go[ing] to the brink and 
beyond – with fire-breathing rhetoric - and retrieve the situation only at the last 
minute.”208 
In the middle of the 1994 crisis for example, Pyongyang insisted that imposing 
sanctions against North Korea would be a “declaration of war.”209  On September 11, 
2001, a day of crisis for American national security, North Korea threatened to proceed 
with missile testing.210  In November 2002, when talks with Japan slowed, the DPRK 
threatened to “reconsider” its self-imposed moratorium on missile launches.211  On 
December 31, 2002, the day that IAEA inspectors left the country, North Korean officials 
threatened to withdraw from the NPT.212  In the last few months Pyongyang has issued a 
series of threats, including one to "destroy the earth" if the U.S. resorted to nuclear war 
against it,213 and has made statements that it would win a nuclear war against the United 
States.214  This threatening rhetoric is not new either.  In 1994, a North Korean official 
stated his South Korean counterpart would “burn in a sea of fire,” and in 1998, the vice-
minister of the People’s Armed Forces threatened to “blow up the territory of the United 
States as a whole.”215  
One thing that has changed, however, is that the Kim regime is no longer relying 
solely on empty threats to get results, he is backing up those threats with actions.  As 
early as February 2000, the DPRK threatened to restart their reactors if the United States 
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did not provide financial “compensation” for delays in the completion of the first KEDO 
LWR.216  Since Kim’s threats did not yield results, he is using timing, coupled with 
action to achieve his goals.  The introduction of “action” into the DPRK’s game of 
economic terrorism makes the stakes even higher.  It seems that while Kim Jong Il’s 
policies are driven by the rules of a game that he has devised, the United States and its 
allies, must trod carefully to prevent him from crossing the line from economic terrorism 
into full-fledged military action.  All the while, the aim of U.S. policies must be to 
counter the short-term and long-term threats posed by the DPRK.  
    
B. THE THREAT 
Despite the fact that the DPRK has a long history of barking rhetoric during 
crisis-type situations, there is a very real threat from North Korea – a threat that should be 
taken seriously.  There are three factors that make the situation so precarious: capability, 
ideology and desperation. 
1. 
                                                
Capability217 
As was discussed in detail in Chapter III, the fact that North Korea has produced 
chemical, biological and presumably nuclear weapons, and has deployed long-range 
ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States, make these weapons a threat to 
the United States’ national security.     
Through their Army, Air Force and Navy, the North Koreans have the military 
capability to strike out across the demilitarized zone by air, by land and by sea.  And, 
while the DPRK has grown weaker militarily and economically, some believe the North 
has focused on improving its ability to inflict a “tremendous -- if short-lived -- artillery 
attack on the South Korean capital.”218  
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In addition to the direct military threat, there are two sets of North Korean 
ideological principles, which are not mutually exclusive and are equally dangerous to the 
United States.  These are: alliance building with countries that oppose U.S. policy, and an 
extremist form of national solipsism.   
In the past, North Korea has aligned itself with countries in the Middle East, such 
as Iran, Libya, and Syria, that have opposed U.S. policy in the region or have hosted 
terrorist organizations.219   Some observers see Pyongyang’s motive as building alliances 
with countries that oppose U.S. global influence. 220   For example, in 1979 North Korea 
supported the Islamic revolution in Iran, which overthrew the Shah, a key U.S. ally. 221   
And, as was previously discussed, North Korea has sought to earn currency from sales of 
arms and technology to Middle Eastern countries.222  As recently as December 10, 2002, 
a shipment of a dozen SCUD missiles was intercepted on its way from North Korea to 
Yemen.223   
The second North Korean ideology that poses perhaps the greatest threat to the 
U.S. and its allies is based the idea of national solipsism previously discussed in Chapter 
III.  Kim Jong il not only believes that North Korea is at the center of the world, he also 
believes that he is the most powerful leader in the world.  This is why unification talks 
have failed between North and South Korea.224  Kim Jong il has “…vowed ‘complete 
liberation of the peninsula,’ a task left ‘half-done’ by Kim Il-sung.  He is apparently 
determined to become ‘the president of a unified Korea’ through armed force.”225  A 
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revelation was made by prominent defector Hwang Jang-yop that outlines Kim Jong Il’s 
frighteningly plausible plans to bring this fantasy to fruition: 
The North will commence its offensive after fabricating an ‘invasion 
north’ by its commando units in ROK uniforms. Artillery bombardment 
will leave Seoul in ruins in five or six minutes, and then armored forces 
will launch a general offensive along the DMZ, occupying Pusan and the 
entire southern half of the peninsula before reinforcement by U.S. Pacific 
forces.  U.S. intervention will be countered by threats of missile attacks on 
several Japanese cities, including Tokyo, thus stalling reinforcement by 
U.S. forces until occupation is complete. 226 
3. Desperation 
                                                
The continuing economic crisis that North Korea faces is another cause for 
genuine concern about tensions on the peninsula.  Besides ideological reasons for the 
leaders of the DPRK to sell weaponry to nations that oppose the U.S. and its policies, the 
weapons trade itself is extremely lucrative for them.  In addition, since economic reasons 
drive Kim Jong Il’s tactics, there is danger that the weaker North Korea becomes, the less 
willing it is to bargain.  David Sanger points out, “While that may seem counterintuitive, 
the North Koreans usually get tougher as they get cornered. In cultural terms, they may 
be more willing to accept risks in a situation of desperation.” 227  
Whether it is for security, ideological, or desperation reasons that North Korea 
continues to proliferate nuclear weapons, it poses one final and more long term threat that 
is based on the “domino effect.”  The director of U.S. central intelligence, George J. 
Tenet, argues that North Korea's nuclear program, combined with the weakening of 
international controls would encourage other nations to “follow suit.”228  He stated that 
these nations may conclude that engaging in nuclear weapons proliferation provides the 
best way to deter threats from more powerful nations, especially when their neighbors 
and regional rivals are already doing so.229 
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 C. COUNTERING THE THREAT: ATTEMPTS AT DIPLOMACY 
1. 
                                                
The Clinton Administration: Post-Framework Policies230  
Chapters III and IV touched on how the U. S. conducted its foreign policy with 
the DPRK specifically during the crisis of 1994.  Jimmy Carter’s negotiation of the 
Agreed Framework managed to stave off military confrontation, which can always be 
seen as a victory.  Arguably, since officials in the United States and North Korea find 
themselves in essentially the same position that they did at the beginning of that crisis, 
the appeasement policies the United States adopted were a patch and not a solution.   
Prior to 1998, the United States had a policy of “indefinite conventional 
deterrence” and it was this policy that facilitated the 1994 Agreed Framework. 231  In 
1998, the bravado of the Taepo Dong launch prompted the Clinton administration to 
review that policy.  In October, Secretary of Defense William Perry and his deputy 
advisor, Ashton B. Carter, were charged with the task.  Immediately they realized that 
there had been three major changes that could seriously affect the U.S./DPRK policy.  
First, was the death of Kim Il Sung and assumption of leadership by Kim Jong Il.  This 
new leadership was different from that with which the Agreed Framework was 
negotiated.  In addition, the North Korean economy had collapsed; industrial and food 
production had dropped; and between floods and droughts, the country was experiencing 
widespread famines so bad that ten percent of the population had died from starvation or 
related illnesses. 232   
The second issue facing the policy review team was the continued question of the 
country’s nuclear program.  Although the Kumchang-ri incident did not yield proof that 
the North Koreans were engaging in nuclear related activities, questions remained.  
Ashton Carter emphasized, “To create weapons of mass destruction, DPRK officials 
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simply needed to take fuel at Yongbyon and undertake a short reprocessing campaign to 
produce the amount of plutonium needed for several nuclear bombs.”   This process, he 
pointed out, could be started “at any time, and with only a few days notice.” 233 
The third issue was related to former South Korean President Kim Dae Jung’s 
“Engagement Policy” toward North Korea.  A major ally of the United States and host to 
37,000 U.S. troops, South Korea was considered paramount to accomplishing U.S. 
security objectives on the peninsula.234  With these issues in mind, the team considered 
several options. 
The following discussion of the policies considered and rejected, and the final 
chosen strategy is derived from the team’s final report: “Review of the United States 
Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations.”235  From the beginning, 
the review team rejected the idea of an “American policy” and sought to consult South 
Korean President Kim, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and Japanese Prime Minister 
Obuchi.  The team then evaluated several options, the first being to undermine the DPRK 
with a “pressure” approach designed to “hasten the demise of the Kim Jong Il regime.” 
Due to lack of internal resistance and because of such strict governmental restraints, a 
policy of this sort would take longer than it would take for the DPRK to develop its 
nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles.  This policy of pressure, the team concluded, 
could be more harmful to the citizens of North Korea than to the government, and was 
not generally supported by the international participants needed to make the option work. 
Another policy that was ultimately rejected by the team was to “Reform the 
DPRK” politically and economically.    Like the previous option, reformation would take 
more time than national security could allow.  In addition, a policy with the goal of  
establishing democracy and market reform would clearly require DPRK cooperation, but 
would be seen by Pyongyang as more like undermining than reforming. 
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A third policy that was considered was that of “status quo.”  While it served U.S. 
security interests, it did not allow for DPRK-led changes beyond our control, namely the 
re-start of the Yongbyon facilities and a renewed nuclear crisis on the peninsula. 
Another policy was considered, that of “buying our objectives.”  This option 
addressed the major concern of economic terrorism that is perpetrated by the DPRK.  
This option was flatly rejected because:  
Such a policy of trading material compensation for security would only 
encourage the DPRK to further blackmail, and would encourage 
proliferators worldwide to engage in similar blackmail.  Such a strategy 
would not, and should not, be supported by the Congress , which controls 
the U.S. government’s purse strings. 236 
 
Finally the team decided on a “Comprehensive and Integrated Approach: A Two-
Path Strategy.”  The first path of the joint strategy was to seek “complete and verifiable 
assurances” that: the DPRK did not have a nuclear weapons program; that testing, 
production and deployment of missiles did not exceed set parameters; and that all export 
sales of such missiles and associated parts and technology were ceased.  This path, the 
team believed, would lead to a stable security situation on the peninsula, but it was based 
solely on complete cooperation from the leaders of the DPRK.  Thus, “prudence” dictated 
that a second path also be devised, also in coordination with other Asian leaders.   
In the event that North Korea failed to comply with the first path and a threat 
ensued, “…the United States and its allies would have to take other steps to assure their 
security and contain the threat.”  The review team asserted that the U.S. and its allies 
should make every effort to maintain the Agreed Framework and to avoid direct conflict, 
but they also insisted that they should take “firm and measured steps” to persuade the 
DPRK to return to the first path.  “The North Korea Policy Review was Clinton 
administration policy, adopted in toto by the administration.”237  
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2. 
                                                
The Bush Administration: Continued Attempts 
When George W. Bush took office in January, 2001, he tasked the U.S. State 
Department to perform a similar review of the North Korea policy in conjunction with 
South Korea and Japan.  In the meantime, the Bush administration said, they would not 
negotiate with the North Koreans.  In June, the policy review was completed and the 
President issued a statement outlining his new Korea policy.238  He directed his national 
security team to undertake “serious discussions” with North Korea in areas such as: 
improving implementation of the Agreed Framework; verifying constraints on North 
Korea's missile programs and bans on its missile exports; and adopting a “less threatening 
conventional military posture.” 239   Bush further stated that the United States’ objective 
was to develop a “constructive relationship” wherein the United States would encourage 
issues of North-South reconciliation; peace on the Korean peninsula; and greater regional 
stability.   The policy would “offer North Korea the opportunity to demonstrate the 
seriousness of its desire for improved relations,” Bush said, and if North Korea were to 
respond affirmatively and take “appropriate action,” the United States’ pledged to help 
the North Korean people, ease sanctions, and take other political steps.” 240   
Highly characteristic of the North Korean negotiation strategy (which will be 
discussed at length in the next section), Pyongyang responded to the proposed 
discussions by blaming the United States for economic losses from the delay of the LWR 
project, and demanding financial compensation.  A spokesman for the DPRK stated, “We 
cannot but evaluate the U.S. proposal as unilateral and conditional in its nature and 
hostile in its intentions.  The U.S.-proposed agenda concerns our nuclear, missile and 
conventional armaments and this all is nothing but an attempt to disarm us.”241  
Despite the belligerent remarks, North Korean officials allegedly met with U.S. 
officials at an unpublicized meeting in New York on July 13, 2003 to discuss 
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Washington's policy.242  Pyongyang was interested in whether or not the Bush team 
would issue a statement of no hostile intentions, as the Clinton Administration had.  The 
discussion suggested that North Korea was willing to negotiate.  First, however, 
Pyongyang was looking for the U.S. to make a concession to get it to the bargaining 
table.243    
During his July trip to Asia, and even after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
Secretary of State Colin Powell continuously restated that U.S. policy was to support a 
second North-South summit, and that the administration was “ready to meet with the 
North Koreans without any preconditions.”244  In the next few months, however, United 
States national security interests demanded an evaluation of terrorist states around the 
world.  In January 2002, during his State of the Union address, George W. Bush said, 
“North Korea is a regime arming with missiles and weapons of mass destruction, while 
starving its citizens.”  He then said of Iraq, Iran, and North Korea: 
States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming 
to threaten the peace of the world.  By seeking weapons of mass 
destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They could 
provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their 
hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United 
States. 245 
 
Independently these statements are indeed factual, and illustrate the 
administration’s concern over proliferation by potential terrorists.  Somehow, however, 
many in the international community, and of course in the DPRK, drew from these 
words, the advent of a new U.S.-North Korea foreign policy.  In the wake of the media 
frenzy following the address, George Bush met with South Korean President  Kim Dae-
                                                 
242 Crock, Stan, “A U.S.-North Korea Deal Isn't Dead Yet,” July19, 2001, Business Week [online] 
<http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jul2001/nf20010719_130.htm> 
243 Ibid.  
244 Powell, Colin L., “Remarks With Foreign Minister Han Song-su of South Korea After Their 
Meeting (1135 hrs)” September 18, 2001, State Department [online] 
<http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2001/4937.htm> 
245 George Bush, Transcript, “State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002, The White House 
[online] <http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020129-11.html> 
62
Jung reiterating his desire to have unconditional talks with North Korea, but added that 
he did “not yet receive a response from that country.”246  
In April 2002, in a memorandum to Secretary of State Powell, George W. Bush 
described what he believed to be “significant progress on eliminating the North Korean 
ballistic missile threat, including further missile tests and its ballistic missile exports.”247  
In addition, he stated that “the parties to the Agreed Framework have taken and continue 
to take demonstrable steps to implement the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the 
Korean Peninsula” and that “North Korea is complying with all provisions of the Agreed 
Framework.” 248  While it is probable that the president had information to the contrary, 
the statements made in this memorandum served to show good-faith toward North Korea 
and to procure $95 million for KEDO for “nonproliferation efforts on the peninsula.”249 
Also in April, the Republic of Korea special envoy's visit to North Korea yielded 
what seemed to be very optimistic results.  The delegation reported North Korea’s 
willingness to resume dialogue with the United States and Japan, as well as its decision to 
resume consultations with KEDO.250 They expressed their support for the continued 
implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework including construction of the LWR 
project. 251   
Again the U.S. reinforced its commitment to the Agreed Framework on August 7, 
2002, at the concrete pouring ceremony for the light water reactor (previously discussed 
in Chapter 4).  This time, however, Ambassador Pritchard, stated that it did not make 
sense for either KEDO or the DPRK to “push forward to completion of a significant 
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portion of the first reactor just to stop work for years if the DPRK only then begins to 
deliver on their safeguards obligations.”252   
These remarks (and the $95 million) indicated an earnest attempt by the Bush 
administration to facilitate implementation of the Framework by both parties.  This was 
assuming, however, that both parties had intentions of implementing the agreement in the 
first place.  At this ground-breaking, North Korea was called to verify that all its nuclear 
activities were declared, and that none of these activities were used for the production or 
development of nuclear weapons.253  The problem was, North Korea could not comply 
with either provision; two months later Pyongyang admitted that among other WMD 
programs, it had a secret nuclear program.  
After this disclosure, the United States took a justifiably less amiable approach to 
North Korean foreign policy.  Coining the phrase “tailored containment” the President 
declared that “the threat of growing isolation was the best way to force North Korea to 
give up its nuclear ambitions.”254  The American plan included threats of economic 
sanctions by the United Nations Security Council, American military interception of 
missile shipments to deprive the North of money from weapon sales, and a call to North 
Korea's neighbors to reduce economic ties to Pyongyang. 255 
The administration held to its refusal to negotiate directly with the DPRK, 
insisting it would not negotiate with North Korea until it abandons its nuclear weapons 
programs.256  Senior administration officials indicated that the U.S. would be willing to 
hold low-level talks “if North Korea had something constructive to say” but that “there 
would be no deal-making.”257 
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Information provided by Hwang Jang-yop, personal aid to Kim Il Sung and Kim 
Jong Il’s Juché teacher, who defected to the South in 1997, underscores the possibility 
that North Korea was seeking provocation by the United States to “up the ante,” at the 
same time the U.S. is involved in preparations for war with Iraq.  Hwang stated, “It is the 
firm and invariable policy of North Korea to wage war.  However, I believe that if it 
breaks out, it will be full-scale, although the North may be able to touch off a 
provocation.258  As for when North Korea will provoke a war, it will take into 
consideration both the international situation and the domestic one.”259 
Throughout the early months of 2003 President Bush remained optimistic that 
there would be a peaceful resolution to the current Korea conflict.  He stated, “it's a 
diplomatic issue, not a military issue, and we're working all fronts.”260  The 
administration even softened its resolve about meeting with North Korean officials, but 
“only about the obligations that already exist under the 1994 framework.”  According to 
State Department spokesman Richard Boucher, “We're not going to provide any quid pro 
quos for North Korea to live up to its existing obligations.”261  The administration does 
say, however, it would maintain a “robust military deterrent in the region even as it seeks 
a diplomatic solution to the impasse.”262 
 
D. BLOCKED ATTEMPTS: NORTH KOREAN DEMANDS 
The question remains then, what does North Korea ultimately want from this 
situation?  Since the beginning of this latest power struggle, the DPRK asked for two 
things: direct talks and a treaty of non-aggression with the United States.  
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The primary reason that U.S. officials will not conduct bilateral discussions with 
the DPRK is that if they do, the talks will certainly fail.  The reason…a heretofore 
irreconcilable difference in negotiating styles and expectations.  Korean War commander 
General Matthew B. Ridgway indicated his frustration with the North Korean negotiating 
style when he said, “Sometimes the repetition of points already made, the oratorical 
flourishes, the tiresome vituperation were nearly enough to make men welcome a return 
to battle.”263  
Chuck Downs, a defense and national security specialist may have the key to 
understanding North Korea’s negotiating strategy.  First of all, he says, even the 
fundamental purpose of the negotiation itself is viewed differently by Pyongyang.  
Whereas Americans negotiate in order to reach an agreement, it seems that the North 
Korean objective is to gain concessions and benefits merely in the process of agreeing to 
talk.  Once at the negotiating table, North Koreans have a series of conflicting techniques 
that they use to intimidate and manipulate their opponents.  Among other tactics, they 
alternate between using insults and flattery.  They will stall and delay or demand 
immediate action.  They portray themselves as strong and deserving of prerogatives, or as 
victims seeking reparations.  Either they wait for opponents to “tip their hands,” or insist 
on being first to present demands and accusations.  They play external forces against each 
other, or feign internal issues over negotiating authority.264   
As if this dichotomy of technique were not difficult enough to work with, Downs 
points out that North Korea has adopted other hallmark traits to their negotiating style.  
When North Korean officials agree to hold talks with an opposing party such as the 
United States, they often set preconditions for the talks, create incidents to redirect 
attention of the parties, put opponents on the defensive, load the agenda with foregone 
conclusions or re-negotiate previously tabled provisions, and reverse accusations made 
by their opponents. 265  A statement by Ken Quinones, former North Korean Affairs 
officer for the U.S. State Department, illustrates the confusing, numerous steps 
policymakers must go through before negotiations with North Korean officials can begin.  
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He was referring to the Secretary of State deciding not to attend “negotiations set up for 
preconditions for negotiations.”266  This indicates that even to have a negotiation with 
North Korean officials, one must first negotiate pre-conditions for the negotiations.   
Another cause for negotiation failure is that North Koreans insist on negotiating 
their objectives first.  While this in itself is not uncommon, the opposing parties (i.e. the 
U.S.) are left with little bargaining power.  While Westerners view “concessions” as a 
normal part of the bargaining process, North Koreans view them as “giving up one’s right 
or privilege to others,” so after they have met their objectives, they have no reason or 
desire to concede to any demands. 267   
  The second of the DPRK’s demands being refused, is that the U.S. provide 
North Korea with a treaty of non-aggression.  The DPRK insists that they have continued 
their nuclear program because of the threat of nuclear force from the United States.  
There are some that believe this explanation for the DPRK’s continued proliferation, 268 
but it seems that this excuse is more of Pyongyang’s rhetoric.  While President George 
W. Bush has made several inflammatory statements regarding North Korea, that does not 
change the fact that tactical nuclear weapons were removed from the peninsula and from 
Pacific aircraft carriers in 1991, and that after 1993, U.S. military exercises in South 
Korea dropped scenarios of nuclear weapons use. 
In addition, Secretary of State Colin Powell has repeatedly stated that the United 
States does not plan to use nuclear weapons against North Korea.269  This can be viewed 
as the closest thing to a “formal assurance” to Pyongyang that the U.S. will not use 
nuclear weapons against it.270  Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, explained that 
                                                 
266 NewsHour with Jim Lehrer Transcript, “North Korea Nuclear Threat” December 30, 2002, PBS 
[online] <http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/asia/july-dec02/korea_12-30.html> 
267 Downs, 10. 
268 Harrison, Chapter 16.   
269 Colin Powell, Transcript, “Powell Discusses Iraq, North Korea on ABC's This Week: Interview on 
ABC's This Week With George Stephanopoulos,” February 9, 2003, U.S. Department of State [online] 
<http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/nea/iraq/text2003/0209pwl3.htm> 
270 The United States, under the Agreed Framework should provide formal assurances to the DPRK 
that it will not use nuclear weapons against it.  Herein lies another problem with the Agreed Framework 
being negotiated out of the scope of formal U.S. policy.  When this agreement was made, the U.S. had 
already pledged to provide a nuclear umbrella over Japan and the ROK so they would not need to 
proliferate nuclear weapons for themselves.  This umbrella policy did not discount the use of nuclear 
weapons against the DPRK in the event that it attacked South Korea. 
67
the United States maintains a nuclear umbrella policy to reassure U.S. “friends and allies 
that we have and will have the kind of capability necessary to provide a nuclear umbrella 
over them,” thereby, “dissuading them from thinking they need nuclear weapons.”271   
This does not mean that the United States would not use nuclear weapons against 
Korea in any case, however.  A classified plan called the Nuclear Posture Review was 
presented to congress on January 8, 2002.   This document outlines a contingency plan to 
use nuclear weapons against at least seven countries, to include North Korea, and which 
called for developing new nuclear weapons that would be better suited for striking targets 
such as those in North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria and Libya.272  In an official statement, 
Secretary of State Powell insisted that “we should not get all carried away with some 
sense that the United States is planning to use nuclear weapons in some contingency that 
is coming up in the near future. It is not the case.”  He also stated that “What the 
Pentagon has done with this study is sound, military, conceptual planning, and the 
president will take that planning and he will give his directions on how to proceed.”273   
Just because the United States makes plans in the event that a war happens, does 
not mean that it intends to go to war.  National security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, 
indicated that the report was in keeping with the United States’ nuclear umbrella 
deterrent policy.  “No one should be surprised that the United States worries a great deal 
about the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the only way to deter such a use 
is to be clear that it would be met with a devastating response,” she said, “That is the 
basis of this report.” The report itself indicates that the plan is of a defensive nature, 
rather an offensive one and says the Pentagon should be prepared to use nuclear weapons 
in an Arab-Israeli conflict, in a war between China and Taiwan, or in an attack from 
North Korea on the south.  
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Although Kim Jong Il appears to enjoy games of brinksmanship, the DPRK 
because of its military capability, its anti-U.S. ideology and its desperate economic 
situation poses a serious threat to the United States, its assets and its allies.  Although the 
United States has maintained policies which uphold its responsibilities under the Agreed 
Framework, the DPRK has show blatant disregard for said agreement.  The fact that the 
DPRK has continued its WMD programs as an incentive, coupled with its recent 
demands to meet unilaterally with the United States, indicates that the DPRK wants to get 
its former financier back to the negotiating table.  Hindsight, however, has allowed U.S. 
policymakers to see how they have been previously manipulated during negotiations, and 
enabled them to formulate a policy that insists on multilateral talks.  It is in this 
environment that steps can be taken to stop this new bout of economic terrorism and set 
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VI. CREATING LONGTERM STABILITY: 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. OVERCOMING TENSIONS OF 2003 
Before the United States can begin to apply a long-term solution for the Korean 
peninsula, the recent nuclear-related tensions between Washington and Pyongyang must 
be alleviated.  This section is not intended to provide a thorough analysis of every option, 
instead, it is intended to outline a few ways that the United States can, from this point, 
move toward its ultimate policy goal: peace and stability on the Korean peninsula.   
This section will outline three possible options for the United States in pursuit of 
its mid-term goal of neutralizing the North Korean nuclear threat: maintain a policy of 
calculated indifference, conduct a military strike, or positively engage North Korea. 
1. Calculated Indifference 
The White House is currently implementing a series of policies that can be called 
“calculated indifference” toward North Korea.  While this course is one of perceived 
inaction, a maintaining of the status quo as it were, it should not be confused with having 
“no policy.”  
a. The Pros 
Under this policy, the administration continues to refuse bilateral 
negotiations with Pyongyang insisting instead on multilateral talks.  The ensuing battle 
between Pyongyang’s repeated requests and Washington’s repeated denials bought the 
United States time as it geared up for military action in Iraq.  With the Washington issue 
unresolved, it is not likely that Kim Jong Il will be taking any drastic action regarding his 
nuclear proliferation, such as beginning plutonium reprocessing; if he did, he would not 
have much negotiating power at the table.   
In addition, the U.S. is standing firm on its policy of “not negotiating with 
terrorists.”  President Bush can show that his administration will not give in to Kim Jong 
Il’s economic terrorism any longer.  By not going to the negotiating table, the United 
States will not make concessions that will ultimately be used to fund Pyongyang’s 
military and WMD programs.   
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The “calculated” aspect of this policy is being kept low-key.  While 
publicly the United States continues to deny bilateral talks, Secretary of State Powell 
reported, “we have a number of diplomatic initiatives underway, some of them very, very 
quietly underway to see if we cannot get a multilateral dialog started.”274  This statement 
does not mean that the U.S. is holding “secret talks” with Pyongyang, as one overzealous 
journalist reported.275  It is more likely that Secretary Powell’s statement indicated that 
the U.S. is negotiating terms for help from other powers in the region such as Japan, 
China, Russia, or South Korea.  In addition, by not getting directly involved in the 
situation, the United States is giving these other nations in the region, who also have a 
great security interest, the opportunity to deal directly with North Korea.  In the best-case 
scenario, the U.S. may be able to work through other nations to persuade North Korea to 
enter into multilateral dialogue.  If so, the door would be open to conduct long-term 
multilateral agreements, thus transitioning into a long-term solution for stability on the 
peninsula.  Certainly this is what the administration is seeking through these policies. 
b. The Cons 
The problem with this policy is that it can swing hard either way.  The 
alternative  outcome is that the DPRK will escalate tensions.  If the United States 
continues to ignore the DPRK’s requests for bilateral negotiations, the DPRK will 
continue to step up its antagonistic actions.  Donald Gregg, U.S. ambassador to South 
Korea in the first Bush administration, said, “If you push Koreans into a corner and don't 
talk to them, they'll behave worse and worse.”276  Already North Korea has launched 
anti-ship missiles into the Sea of Japan in a show of bravado, ultimately saying to the 
world, “look at us, we have launch capability for our weapons.”    
John Steinbruner, Director of the Center for International and Security 
Studies at Maryland (CISSM), Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and Academic 
Advisor at the Carnegie Corporation of New York, expressed his concerns that “There is 
                                                 
274 Efron, Sonni, “Powell defends Korea Policy,” March 7, 2003, Albany Times Union, A-1.   
275 The article goes on to say that an American citizen not representing the Bush Administration was 
present during a meeting with Japanese and North Korean officials.  For full text go to “U.S., N. Korea 
‘held secret talks,’” March 5, 2003, CNN [online] 
<http://www.cnn.com2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/03/05/nkorea.talks/index.html> 
276 Council on Foreign Relations, “Q&A: Should U.S. Launch Direct Talks with N. Korea?” March 
10, 2003, New York Times [online] <http://www.nytimes.com/cfr/international/mustreads031003.html> 
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considerable danger that an interaction between the U.S. procedural rule – do not 
reinforce blackmail – and the DPRK procedural rule of response in kind might produce a 
violent confrontation that neither side intends or expects.”277   
If North Korea does escalate their actions, depending on how far they go, 
other regional powers may have to get involved and military action may ensue.  On a 
positive note here, unlike the situation in Iraq where the U.S. is being portrayed as the 
“bully,” North Korea will be seen as the antagonist, opening the way for international 
support of the U.S. in a regional conflict. 
2. 
                                                
Military Strike278  
The North Koreans’ initiated their latest barrage of threat-with-action under the 
assumption that the United States would concede to its demands.  U.S. Defense Secretary 
Donald Rumsfeld, in response to the DPRK’s timing, warned North Korea that the 
United States could “fight and win two regional conflicts.”279  He also directed 
Pyongyang not to become “‘emboldened’ by the U.S. administration's immediate focus 
on Iraq.” 280   
While critics continue to highlight the similarities between the situations in Iraq 
and in North Korea, going so far as to say that North Korea poses the more immediate 
threat,281 the Bush administration does not plan to attack the DPRK.  Colin Powell draws 
major distinctions between the two exigencies.  U.S. intelligence officials, he says, 
believe that while North Korea has possessed WMD for some time, it has never used 
these weapons, nor threatened to use them.  Saddam Hussein on the other hand, has used 
 
277 Steinbruner, John, “DPRK Strategic Intentions and US policy Goals,” Slideshow presented at the 
U.S.-DPRK Next Steps Workshop, January 27, 2003, Nautilus Institute [online] 
<http://www.nautilus.org/security/workshop/paper.html> 
278 For a further analysis of this option, see Levi, Michael, “Off Target,” March 2003, Federation of 
American Scientists [online] < http://fas.org/ssp/docs/030324-newrep.htm> 
279 John Gittings and Suzanne Goldenberg, “Rumsfeld gets tough on North Korea,” December 24, 
2002, The Guardian [online] <http://www.guardian.co.uk/korea/article/0,2763,865094,00.html> 
280 Ibid. 
281 As of March 13, 2003, an NBC6.net public opinion poll showed that 31% of its respondents 
believe that North Korea poses a bigger threat to the U.S. than Iraq, while 12% believe that Iraq poses a 
greater threat than North Korea.  NBC6.net [online] < http://www.nbc6.net/news/1725779/detail.html> 
See also, Ashton Carter, “One Expert’s Opinion: North Korea is a More Serious Nuclear Threat than 
Iraq, says Ashton Carter” At the JFK School of Government, Harvard University [online] 
<http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/news/experts/carter_noko_010703.htm> 
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chemical weapons before.  In addition, Hussein has “demonstrated far more evil intent, 
seeking to dominate the Middle East.”282   
While the United States denies planning an attack, this does not mean that they do 
not have a plan of attack.  During the 1994 crisis, a plan was formulated to destroy the 
facilities at Yongbyon…a plan that could be used toward the same ends today.  The 
objective of the strikes would be to “irreparably damage the facilities and surrounding 
support structures, including power plants”283 thus eliminating the immediate nuclear 
threat.    
High-performance aircraft or Tomahawk cruise missiles could be used to damage 
the DPRK’s nuclear facilities.  Because the facilities are heavily reinforced, cruise 
missiles would not completely destroy them, but could damage them severely enough to 
be effective.  While strikes using high-performance aircraft could completely eliminate 
the facilities, heavy air defenses surrounding them would cause a great risk to American 
pilots.284 
One concern about attacking the facilities is the release of radiation that could 
conceivably make its way to South Korea.  If precision targeting was used, it could 
damage the facilities without destroying them, and would cause little or no radiation 
release.  Since the reactor has just recently been restarted, the new fuel load would yield 
minimal radiation release.  In addition, strikes could be targeted in such a way as to cause 
the building to implode without seriously damaging the fuel rods in the core. 285 
As far as the reprocessing facility, even if a few rods were stored there, a 
precision strike on the building would not release a significant release of radiation.  
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Again, with precision targeting, a building implosion would yield virtually no radiation 
release. 286  
a. The Pros 
These carefully conducted strikes on the facilities at Yongbyon, and any 
other sites thought to be nuclear facilities would drastically reduce North Korea’s ability 
to sell nuclear weapons, to use them to extort concessions from the United States, or to 
use them to conquer the peninsula.  
b. The Cons 
One major problem with this option is that for these same reasons, 
Pyongyang’s nuclear program constitutes the economic and strategic lifeblood for the 
DPRK.  Not only would Pyongyang do what it deemed necessary to protect these assets, 
in response to attacks like these, it is more likely than not that North Korea would 
conduct retaliatory attacks on Seoul.  It is also possible that Kim Jong Il would take this 
opportunity to conduct a counter-attack, and attempt to overtake the South, which would 
cause serious destruction and major loss of Korean and American lives.   
Another problem with this option is that unless the DPRK makes serious 
and verifiable threats, the United States would not get support for such an attack from 
regional powers; Japan, China, South Korea and Russia have all asked the United States 
to pursue diplomatic avenues with North Korea.287 
The most serious problem with this approach is that since 1994 when this 
strike plan was first presented, the DPRK has built more nuclear related facilities and the 
United States does not know where they are.  While strikes at Yongbyon would cripple 
plutonium enrichment and reprocessing, the United States CIA “knows North Korea is 
                                                 
286 Ibid. 
287 See “China trying to arrange US-North Korea talks,” March 14, 2003, The Malaysian Star [online] 
<http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2003/3/14/latest/10774Chinatryi&sec=latest>  
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building a uranium-enrichment plant but doesn’t know where, according to two senior 
intelligence officials.”288  It does not appear that these gaps in intelligence will be 
overcome in the near future either.  The installation of underground fiber-optic cables for 
military communications, and the scarcity of human intelligence are just two of the 
hindrances to U.S. intelligence gathering efforts.289 
3. Engagement 
                                                
International officials continue to urge the United States to engage North Korea.  
Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan says China wants the United States and North 
Korea to hold direct talks; and in Moscow, the Foreign Ministry called for direct 
Washington-Pyongyang dialogue.290  Not only have Asian countries asked for a 
diplomatic strategy, North Korea has opened the door for a policy like this, by making 
repeated requests for direct talks with Washington.  In fact, North Korean officials 
suggest that the current situation, which they view as a crisis, “would lead to armed 
conflict unless the United States agreed to one-on-one talks.”291   
There are several U.S. policymakers who are proponents of a policy of 
engagement toward North Korea.  Senate minority leader Tom Daschle of South Dakota, 
for example, “scolded Mr. Bush for playing down the threat from North Korea and urged 
him to ‘immediately engage the North Koreans in direct talks.’”292  Donald Gregg, U.S. 
ambassador to South Korea in the first Bush administration, believes that “immediate 
direct talks between Washington and Pyongyang are necessary to stem North Korea's 
development of nuclear weapons.”293 
 
288 Diamond, John, “N. Korea keeps U.S. intelligence guessing,” March 10, 2003, USA Today 
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DPRK.    
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292 Dao, James, “Bush Administration Defends Its Approach on North Korea,” February 6, 2003, New 
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a. The Pros 
Undeniably this approach could alleviate the current tensions in North 
Korea.  First of all, it would placate Kim Jong Il to have the President yield to his 
demands for negotiations.  For an approach like this to work, American officials would 
have to assume, or pretend to assume, that the North Korean fear of a nuclear attack by 
the United States is genuine.  Washington would thus have to meet with Pyongyang and 
be prepared to enter into a new non-aggression treaty.  Based on the way the Kim Jong Il 
regime does business, Pyongyang would insist upon negotiating its demands first.  Based 
on past experiences with the DPRK, U.S. policymakers must be willing to provide some 
hefty aid packages as well.  In the best-case scenario, the United States would walk away 
in essentially the same position that it was in after signing the Agreed Framework: North 
Korea would freeze its current WMD programs amid hope for further normalization of 
relations between Washington and Pyongyang – paving the way for a long-term peace 
option to be implemented.  
b. The Cons 
While this is a viable option, it would be a costly one for the United States 
literally and figuratively.  First of all, unless the United States was willing to meet every 
demand that the DPRK made, the process could drag on for years.  The North Koreans, 
after being denied a particular demand are prone to leaving the negotiating table.294 If 
they did stay throughout negotiations, it is uncertain at this point what the North Koreans 
plan to ask for.  Based on their demands that the U.S. reimburse them for electricity lost 
during the LWR project, it is certain to be of great financial cost to the U.S.  
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“North Korea has been known to walk out of negotiations with Japan before.” See, Unattributed, “N 






Although the U.S. would be in the same position it was in 1994, i.e. 
having alleviated tensions and avoided a crisis; the U.S. would be in the same position it 
was in 1994, i.e. having found only a short-term fix to the North Korea problem.  The 
DPRK would continue to terrorize the United States every time it needed financial aid, 
and even if Pyongyang agreed to dismantle its current programs, it would just start 
another covert weapons program with that aid.  
4.   A Calculated Effort 
It is very important, no matter how the administration decides to handle the 
current North Korea situation, that the United States continue to react with calm and 
calculation.  Democratic opponents describe President Bush as not responding strongly 
enough to the Korea situation, and as downplaying a serious threat.295  Others argue that 
the Bush administration does not have a specific North Korea policy,296 and that North 
Korea is being allowed to drive U.S. policy.  The truth is that North Korea always creates 
crisis situations to drive policy, and relies on the subsequent re-actions and sense of 
urgency to get their opponents, unprepared, to the negotiating table.  This time the 
administration is being very careful not to over-react to North Korea’s antagonism.  
Secretary of State Colin Powell agreed: “We're prepared to talk to them, but what we 
can't find ourselves in the position of doing is essentially panicking at their activities and 
their demands."297   
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B. LONG TERM SOLUTIONS 
Politicians, scholars and the general public have many opinions about “what to do 
next” with regard to North Korea.  In light of North Korea’s nuclear program and because 
of Kim Jong Il’s quest for capital and regional bargaining power, status quo diplomacy or 
attempts at previously used policies will not achieve U.S. national security goals.  Some 
people believe that diplomacy is the answer, while others argue that military action is 
necessary.  This section will explore some of these options and outline their strengths and 
weaknesses, keeping in mind the ultimate goal for future U.S. policy toward the DPRK: 
how do we counter the North Korean threat, and how do we stop the DPRK’s economic 
terrorism once and for all?  
1. Reunification 
                                                
Because of Kim Jong Il’s strict sense of self-preservation, the only way for 
reunification to be a viable option is for U.S. policymakers to support both North and 
South Korea in a joint peninsular reunification effort.298  This approach would enable the 
United States to build upon the progress made heretofore between the two Koreas.  There 
have been numerous publications, which analyze and outline this approach as a feasible 
way to restore stability and peace to the peninsula.299  The best scenario to present, 
however, is one based on the formulas for joint unification previously proposed by each 
of the Koreas. 
a. Federation or Confederation 
In the 1980s North Korea presented an outline for reunification.  The 
DPRK insisted that the Koreas adopt a federation300 system, which they call the “Koryo 
 
298 For an alternate view, a South-Korean based reunification plan, see Mitchell, Derek J., “A 
Blueprint for U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea,” Winter 2002-2003, The Washington Quarterly [online] 
< http://www.twq.com/03winter/docs/03winter_mitchell.pdf> 
299 Among these sources are:  
Jonathan D. Pollack, and Chung Min Lee, Preparing for Korean Unification: Scenarios and 
Implications, (Rand Corporation, 1999)  
Robert Dujarric, (Editor), Korean Unification and After: U.S. Policy Toward a Unified Korea (Hudson 
Institute, 2000)   
Selig Harrison, Korean Endgame: A Strategy for Reunification and U.S. Disengagement (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, 2002). 
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300 Merriam-Webster defines Federation as “a compact between political units that surrender their 
individual sovereignty to a central authority but retain limited residuary powers of government.” Merriam 
Federation System.”301  This proposal suggested that the two Koreas form a federation, 
but maintain two governments.  The federal government, however, would be responsible 
for exercising diplomatic and military sovereignty.  Under this approach, the two 
countries would immediately implement the federation with no transition period. In 
addition, the DPRK made two demands, that the National Security Act be abolished and 
that American forces be withdrawn from the Korean peninsula. 
South Korea rejected the North Korean approach primarily because 
fundamental differences in each nation’s systems would prevent immediate mutual 
assimilation, so it was necessary, they argued, to have a phase-in approach.  On 
September 11, 1989 South Korea proposed unification under a confederation system302 
which they call the “National Community Unification Formula.”303  This formula is 
based on a phase-in process.  The first objective is to create a partnership between the 
two governments, maintaining the existing “two systems and two governments” on the 
peninsula, but working toward ultimate unification.304  Under this program, a 
“‘consultative body’ would be created which includes an inter-Korean summit, cabinet 
meeting, joint committee by area and combined legislative conference.”305 
 The primary objectives of this system are: to work toward political and 
economic integration; social and cultural unity through cultural exchanges; military 
integration; institutional consolidation, by improving laws presently injurious to 
unification, and preparation of a unification constitution; and the creation of an 
international environment favorable for unification through international cooperation.306  
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bin/dictionary?book=Dictionary&va=federal> 






The fact that South Korea included the possibility for reforming “laws counter to the 
unification process,” may have satisfied the North Korean appeal for National Security 
law abolition. 
During the North-South summit in 1991, with these issues in mind, North 
Korea proposed an updated unification plan that combined elements from the North and 
South’s original proposals.  The formula called for “permanent peace and co-prosperity 
through mutual cooperation.”307  This time Pyongyang suggested that this “loose form of 
federation” should be phased in while keeping the two systems and governments intact.  
Under this revised proposal, both countries would continue to have diplomatic and 
military sovereignty.  This interim period, they suggested, would be used to strengthen 
inter-Korean relations and work toward ultimate unification.  This same proposal was 
presented at the June 2000 summit.308 
A combined project, perhaps similar to this, which addresses the needs of 
both Koreas, is likely to have the most success.  The inter-Korean summit and subsequent 
South-North Joint Declaration have been described as an “historic breakthrough in the 
common pursuit of peace, mutual prosperity and reunification.”309  President Kim Dae-
jung and North Korea's Kim Jong-il concurred on many fundamental issues included in 
the joint declaration, specifically on the “independent reunification of the Korean 
Peninsula.”310  
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b.   The U.S. role 
While both Koreas have agreed that they want reunification to be 
independent of outside forces, the United States, as well as other nations in the region, 
will have a role to play in the process.  There are two main roles for the United States in 
the reunification process.  The first is to simply act as a supportive observer – supportive 
towards both the North and the South.  The primary role for the United States, however, 
would be the gradual withdrawal and removal of U.S. troops from the peninsula.   
c.   The Withdrawal 
U.S. military presence in South Korea has long been seen as an 
impediment to reunification efforts.  In 1998, the DPRK’s Foreign Ministry published a 
memorandum of “Unreasonable U.S. Military Occupation of S. Korea.”311  In the 
memorandum, the DPRK states that U.S. presence poses a threat to the North and is 
preventing unification.  Selig Harrison, director of the Center for International Policy’s 
Asia Project, agrees.  He insists that “in its present form, the U.S. military presence 
sustains a climate of indefinite confrontation.”312 
Not only is a plan such as this possible, the United States has already 
made contingencies toward and statements supporting such a plan.  For example, the 
United States “already has plans in motion to consolidate bases and will phase out dozens 
of its 95 installations by 2011.”313  Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, also showed 
a “readiness to readjust one of the cornerstones of U.S. military policy in South 
Korea.”314  He told the Senate Armed Services Committee that he “might consider 
withdrawing some of the 37,000 U.S. troops stationed in South Korea,” and that he would 
“like to see some U.S. forces pulled away from their forward deployments in Seoul and 
along the [DMZ]”315  
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d.   A Ready Environment 
The environment is ripe for the U.S. to pursue a policy like this.  In the 
last few years, there has been a steady increase in the number of anti-U.S. protests in 
South Korea.  This is partially due to the fact that U.S. military facilities sit right in the 
middle of the densely populated South Korean capital and spill into its suburbs.316  
Most of the protests were peaceful, but took a drastic turn in June 2002, 
when two South Korean girls were struck and killed by an American armored vehicle. In 
September protestors abducted an uninvolved American soldier and took him to a 
candlelight vigil for the girls that became an anti-U.S. protest.317  In November of that 
same year, protestors threw firebombs at a U.S. military facility.318  Political analysts say 
that South Korean President Roh Moo Hyun, a “reform-minded liberal often critical of 
U.S. policy, benefited from the anti-American sentiment to win the December 19 [2002] 
election against his pro-U.S. conservative opponent.”319 
In addition, to anti-U.S. sentiments, the United States’ withdrawal could 
lessen the threat to its Korean-based assets.  Derek Mitchell, a Korean security expert at 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, states that there is an 
increased threat of attack on U.S. bases in South Korea by missiles or other weaponry by 
North Korea or other adversaries.320   
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld described a scenario that would fit 
perfectly into a reunification plan:   
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I'd like to see a number of our forces move away from the Seoul area and 
from the area near the DMZ and be more oriented toward an air hub and a 
sea hub, with the ability to reinforce so there's still a strong deterrent, and 
possibly, with our improved capabilities of moving people, some of those 
forces come back home. 321  
This approach is best for several reasons.  First of all, since North Korea 
has such a formidable army, some South Koreans fear that a “relocation of U.S. troops 
would weaken defenses against a hostile North Korea.”322  A gradual withdrawal, 
however, could be formulated to coincide with progress made in the phases of a joint 
confederation.  In the meantime, the pullback would show that the United States is taking 
a non-threatening stance towards North Korea.  
There are people, both on the peninsula and in the U.S, who believe that a 
U.S. military presence on the peninsula is necessary.323  According to Selig Harrison, 
those people are making several assumptions.324  The first, is that if the U.S. leaves the 
peninsula, a power vacuum will open up and China, Japan and Russia will vie for 
domination of the peninsula.  A second is that a unified Korea will seek a military 
alliance with a neighbor, such as China.  And a third is that a unified Korea would pursue 
its own nuclear capability.  Other skeptics are worried that the removal could mean South 
Korea would have to spend more on its own defense.325  Each of these arguments could 
be countered by U.S. support for a unified Korea, which would adopt the position of a 
neutral, nuclear-free buffer state.326 
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e.   The Asian Reaction327 
For North Korea, both its security concerns and economic issues would be 
addressed by reunification and U.S. military withdrawal.  With U.S. troops pulling away 
from the DMZ, and with a formal reunification support policy, North Korea would see 
that the United States has no intention of becoming an aggressive threat.  Long-term, as a 
neutral buffer state, Korea would prevent the need for a nuclear arms race in the region. 
In addition, Kim Jong Il’s economic concerns could be alleviated.  
Although the South Korean economy is not the strongest it has been, eventually 
reunification would lead to the industrial south having access to plentiful natural 
resources in the north.  The result would be an industrial Korea that could become a 
formidable trading partner with, among other countries, China, Japan and Russia. 
In a scholarly paper, Seong Ok Yoo, writes that Hideshi Takesada, a 
Japanese Northeast Asian security expert outlined how Korean unification would be 
positive.328  Economically speaking, he says, the economies of Japan and the unified 
Korea would be mutually complementary.  Militarily speaking, Japan believes a unified 
Korea would reduce its military for the sake of economic development, allowing Japan to 
reduce its defense costs.  In addition, Japan “no longer having an unpredictable North 
Korea on its coast” would allow redirection of its forces.”329  Even better, a neutral Korea 
would prevent a potential nuclear arms race, a priority for the Japanese.330  Politically 
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speaking, Korean unification “would mean the emergence of three poles: China, the 
unified Korea, and Japan. Cooperation and exchange among these three poles would be 
the basis of ‘a Northeast Asian version of the European Union.’”331  
The Chinese have expressed concerns that a weak North Korean regime 
might implode leading to the “sudden emergence on China's border of a unified Korea 
allied to the United States” and might “also lead to a massive flow of North Korean 
refugees into China.”332  “Beijing's top priority is to preserve the North Korean state as a 
buffer between China and the U.S. sphere of influence in Northeast Asia”333  If a gradual, 
peaceful unification were to occur, and the result was a neutral non-nuclear buffer state 
devoid of U.S. presence, China would have nothing to fear for its security.   
For the Russians, an independent unified Korea would serve as a buffer to 
the expansion of Chinese regional power.334  Political scientist Alvin Z. Rubenstein 
concludes: “of the involved powers – China, Japan, the United States and Russia – Russia 
has the least to lose politically, militarily, or economically from unification.” Indeed, 
Russia’s energy and raw materials markets would compliment an industrial Korea.335 
f.   Impediments to Reunification 
A policy of supporting reunification and gradual troop withdrawal appears 
to work well towards achieving the United States’ goal of peace and stability on the 
Korean peninsula.  The reunification itself would help alleviate regional fears of a rogue 
nuclear North Korea and lead to a productive regional economic partner.  The reduction 
of U.S. forces would quell North Korea’s fear of an American attack and China’s fear of 
a Chinese/American-controlled Korean border, in the event of a North Korean collapse.   
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There are several significant impediments to Korean unification, however, 
that will make a peaceful reunification next to impossible.336  One fundamental flaw in 
any policy that seeks Korean reunification is: there is little indication that North Korea 
intends to peacefully unify.  First of all, there is a fundamental difference between the 
unification proposals of the two Koreas.  While South Korea proposes a Confederation 
with a consultative body, the North Koreans propose a “loose form of Federation.”  What 
is conspicuously lacking from their plan, however, is the identification of who will run 
this “federal” government.  
Concerns to this effect were voiced by representatives of the Grand 
National Party who criticized Kim Dae Jung and “denounced the government's inter-
Korean policy as appeasing or accommodating the North Korean common-front 
unification strategy, aimed at communize (sic) the whole Korean peninsula by force.”337  
They were not too far off-base according to the North Korean defector presented earlier, 
Mr. Hwang, who states “unification by use of force is the only method Kim Jong-il 
considers feasible. While the junior Kim acknowledges economic disparities, North 
Korea believes it has enough power to guarantee unification by force, barring 
intervention from the United States.”338 
During the June 2000 summit, it did not seem logical when “the North’s 
Kim told South Korean President Kim Dae-jung that U.S. troops might be able to stay 
even after eventual unification of the Koreas.”339  Previously the North had “steadfastly 
demanded a U.S. troop withdrawal as a precondition for reconciliation.” 340  After the 
historic summit, inter-Korean relations began to quickly thaw, leading many critics to 
                                                 
336 For a discussion of some of these issues see, Gerrit Gong, “What If Korea Unifies,” Updated July 
2000, WorldLink [online] <http://www.worldlink.co.uk/stories/storyReader$291>  
337 “Ideological Clash Over NK Policy” editorial, November 15, 2000, The Korea Times [online] 
<http://www.hankooki.com/kt_op/200011/t20001115173851481138.htm> 
338 Hwang Jang Yop, Transcript, “Hwang Jang Yop Speaks,” January, 1999, Federation of American 
Scientists [online] <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/rok/nis-docs/hwang1.htm> 
339 Jeremy Kirk, “Albright: U.S., Japan, South Korea must present united front,” October 27, 2000, 
Stars and Stripes <http://www.pstripes.com/ed102700c.html> 
340 Ibid. 
87
wonder if North Korea’s diplomacy was simply a tactic to obtain economic assistance 
and reduce the U.S. troop presence in South Korea.”341 
Not surprisingly then, on August 4, 2001, during a summit with Russian 
President Vladimir Putin, in a complete reversal, “the DPRK reiterated its position that 
the withdrawal of American troops from South Korea ‘will endure no delay and is a 
pressing problem’ in the interests of peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and in 
Northeast Asia.”342  Did North Korea make such a radical reversal in their policy toward 
U.S. troop withdrawal within the year?   
A more likely scenario is that the North Korean policies regarding both 
reunification efforts and U.S. troop withdrawal disclosed at the 2000 North-South Korean 
summit were simply propaganda.  In keeping with this thesis’ assertion that North 
Koreans will do anything for money, it was revealed that Pyongyang received a hefty 
sum of money from Seoul, widely thought by its critics to be a bribe for the 2000 
summit.343   
In 1998, Japan's New Japan Trading Company facilitated a meeting 
between Hyundai chairman Jung Mong Hyun and North Korean officials at a “Beijing 
Secret Meeting.”  The South Korean National Intelligence Agency (NIA) “coached 
Hyundai behind the scenes” since Hyundai's opening up to North Korea was in line with 
NIA's new policy of accommodation.  During subsequent meetings, Hyundai agreed to 
pay North Korea $500 million dollars for exclusive rights for the “Seven Mega Projects” 
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which included ventures in tourism, railroads, communication, ship scrapping, 
electronics, the Imjin River dam, and Kaesong industrial park.344   
Shortly thereafter, the North’s agreement to participate in the summit was 
made public, strategically, days before the South Korean general election of April 13, 
2000. Interestingly, North Korea requested the date of the summit be pushed back a day 
and stated that the reason for the delay was that North Korea had received only $400 
million and $100 million was still outstanding.345  All of these circumstances suggest that 
the Hyundai $500 Million Payment was at least partially a summit bribe. 
More convincingly, however, was the admission by Kim Dae Jung that the 
South Korean government secretly paid $200 of the $500 million to Pyongyang.346  The 
secret money transfer was made in violation of South Korea's National Security Law, 
which designates the North a "traitor regime," and was made without official approval by 
the unification ministry.347 Although President Kim denies the money was a payoff for 
the summit agreement, he said he provided the illegal cash payments because he wanted 
to “secure peace on the peninsula and promote national interest.”348 
It is not unlikely, given the circumstances, that part of the payment 
provided by Seoul was for a previously arranged summit script for Pyongyang to 
deliver… a script that was designed to make the two Koreas appear closer to reunification 
than ever before, and to create a false sense of success of Kim Dae Jung’s Sunshine 
policy.  In addition, this evidence fosters doubt that any of North Korea’s previous steps 
towards reunification were sincere and not simply purchased.  
Pyongyang, in its search for economic support, has everything to gain 
from the Sunshine policy, which critics view as overly conciliatory.349  Even the 
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definition of Seoul’s policy states that the policy supports “the funneling of economic 
assistance and diplomatic favors from the South to the North, hoping to eventually soften 
North Korea's stances in the course of promoting peace and cooperation on the Korean 
peninsula.”350  It is not likely that North Korea’s reunification stance will soften so long 
as it continues to be rewarded for steps forward and steps backward.351    
It is evident that when the North begins raising tensions, the South 
counters with concessions.352  It seems then, that all Pyongyang has to do every once in a 
while is make a few well-placed statements or agree to a few well-publicized events in 
the name of reunification.353  For their trouble, they continue to get paid.  Although it is 
not as pronounced as with the United States because of the conciliatory nature of South 
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  Regime Change 
A second policy option for the United States to remove the threat posed by the 
Kim Jong Il regime, is to remove Kim Jong Il from power.  Not only is there reason to do 
so because “nuclear weapons, missile exports and support for terrorism are horrors Kim 
Jong Il inflicts on the outside world, 354 but also because like every good dictator, his 
treatment of his own people is a “bloody record of starvation and murder.”355   
Traditionally there are several ways that a regime change can come about.  
Internal factions can rise up and take over the government, overthrowing the regime; 
diplomatic measures from external forces can cause the collapse of the current 
government; or the regime can be overthrown by force.   
a. Internal Factions 
The first possibility is that internal dissenters can band together to 
overthrow the government.  The “Great Leader,” however, in his steadfast and somewhat 
manic desire to preserve his regime, rounds up everyone who even hints at dissent.  Some 
200,000 political prisoners are incarcerated in North Korean Gulags, or slave labor 
camps.356  “Entire families, including grandchildren, are incarcerated for even the most 
bland political statements, and forced abortions are carried out on pregnant women so 
that another generation of political dissidents will be ‘eradicated.’”357   
Even within the Kim Jong Il Regime, there is speculation that there are 
“very few officials who work honestly for the regime out of genuine loyalty,” rather, 
“most of them are pretending to be loyal to the regime out of the need to protect 
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themselves and their families.”358  Kim Jong Il, it seems, has made sure that there is 
really no viable opposition in North Korea.  
b. External Diplomatic  
Another regime change tactic is based on diplomatic efforts, usually by 
pressure or sanctions, designed to strangle the government into collapse.  The 2002/2003 
nuclear issue has been forwarded to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) and 
one of their options in dealing with this situation is the imposition of sanctions on North 
Korea.  One problem with this tactic when dealing with the Kim Jong Il regime, is that 
the North Korean economy is already in shambles.  Chuck Downs points out, “there are 
limits to economic sanctions, without a doubt, because the economy of North Korea is in 
such bad shape after 50 years of their brand of socialism, that it's hard to actually have an 
impact that makes it any worse.”359  In addition, it is widely thought that sanctions 
“afflict a country’s ordinary citizens, often without affecting the ruling elite.”360   
It is widely known that North Korea would rather arm its military and 
develop its nuclear weapons program than to feed its people, and Kim Jong Il has not 
personally suffered from the famines and collapsed economy.  While millions of North 
Koreans starved to death, “The Great Leader,” and all those close to him, live in the lap 
of luxury.  In 1994 for example, at $630 per bottle, “Hennessy confirmed that Kim was 
its single biggest buyer of cognac for two years running.”  In 1998, “a Mercedes-Benz 
representative was taken aback when Kim ordered 200 Class S Mercedeses (sic) at 
$100,000 apiece; the $20 million price tag was one fifth of the aid promised to North 
Korea that year by the United Nations.”361  In 1999, two Italian chefs and special ovens 
were flown into Pyongyang to provide pizza to Kim Jong Il and his cohorts.362  Currently 
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Jim Jong Il has gold, mined by slave labor, and more than $4 billion dollars in Swiss 
bank accounts.363  Since the economy is so bad, and since it is obvious that Kim Jong Il 
is the last in the country to suffer, economic sanctions designed to collapse the economy 
will not suffice to oust the leader.   
The second problem with imposing sanctions against Kim Jong Il, is that 
since 1994, he has stated repeatedly that any sanctions imposed by the UNSC would be 
“a declaration of war.”364  This warning, the fact that the regime can continue to exist 
while its population dies off, and the fact that there are no internal dissidents willing to 
risk incarceration, and most likely death, to overthrow the government leaves only one 
possibility for executing a regime change – U.S. military action.  
 
c. Military Action  
While U.S. policymakers insist that they have no plans to attack North 
Korea, the situation is prime for Washington to do just that.  The United States is setting 
the example in Iraq - a regime change by force, caused by a dictator’s continued refusal 
to disarm his country of WMD.   
Secretary of Defense Colin Powell has stated that “no military option's 
been taken off the table, although we have no intention of attacking North Korea as a 
nation."365  Like the military strikes on Baghdad, there is no need to attack North Korea 
as a nation; the U.S. would simply conduct strikes designed to eradicate the Kim Jong Il 
regime. 
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The United States already has 37,000 troops stationed in South Korea, and 
approximately 100,000 in nearby Japan.366  The aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson, the 
destroyer USS Lassen and guided-missile cruiser USS Antietam, that are in South Korea 
for Exercise Foal Eagle, an annually scheduled joint and combined training exercise, 
could be utilized in a strike on the North.367 
In addition, 24 long-range bombers have been sent to Guam as a deterrent 
to possible North Korean aggression.368  Utilizing these assets as well as those currently 
employed in the conflict with Iraq, the United States could conduct an attack on 
Pyongyang and attempt to destroy the Kim Jong Il regime. 
d. Impediments to Regime Change  
While most plausible for dealing with the Kim Jong Il regime, this 
military action option is extremely dangerous, and as of now, poses risks that U.S. 
policymakers are not willing to take.  First of all, since there is no outward show of 
opposition to Kim Jong Il, the United States and its allies would be hard-pressed to find a 
suitable replacement for Kim Jong Il.  In addition, there is some concern that the collapse 
of the regime would pose the threat of “loose nukes” falling into the hands of warlords or 
internal factions.369  
The most dangerous aspect of conducting strikes on Kim Jong Il, is the 
regime’s apparent willingness to strike back.  We know that the DPRK has chemical, 
biological, and likely nuclear weapons, and the means by which to deploy them.  Since 
there is a such a gap in U.S. intelligence-gathering ability, however, we do not know how 
many nuclear weapons the DPRK has, or where they are.  In this case U.S. is unable to 
conduct strikes to neutralize these threats.    
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North Korea has long-range artillery pieces and multiple rocket launchers, 
mostly protected in underground facilities, within striking distance of metropolitan Seoul.  
According to a former Combined Forces Command commander, without moving, these 
weapons systems are capable of delivering up to 500,000 rounds per hour for several 
hours.370  The most likely scenario is that if Pyongyang came under attack, Kim Jong Il 
would order a strike on Seoul and the 37, 000 U.S. troops stationed in and near it in a 
confrontation Senator Richard Lugar says, “would be devastating.”371  Of course 
Pyongyang has verbally targeted the U.S. itself.  Reportedly, the communist party's 
newspaper, the Workers' Daily, declared that “‘the army and people of the DPRK are 
fully ready to mercilessly strike the bulwark of U.S. imperialist aggressors’ - implying 
that they could hit targets in the U.S.”372  
e. The Asian Reaction 
Another impediment to this option is that barring an outright pre-emptive 
attack by the DPRK, the countries in Asia would not support United States military 
action in North Korea. 373  Besides, or perhaps because of, the obvious fact that South 
Korea would likely be the first target, South Korean President Roh has not given up on 
the former administration’s Sunshine Policy.  “After his election, Roh said he would not 
go along with the United States, his country's No. 1 ally, if Washington planned to attack 
the North because of its nuclear development.” 374   The fear of reprisal on Seoul for a 
U.S.-led attack was underscored by Foreign Minister Yoon Young-kwan’s statements in 
Washington, that many young South Koreans "favored a North Korea armed with nuclear 
weapons over its collapse, which could trigger a war on the Korean Peninsula."375  South 
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Korea has continuously made pleas saying the United States needs to do more to resolve 
the dispute over North Korea's nuclear programs, adding that direct U.S.-North Korea 
talks would do much to ease tensions.376 
The Japanese government has not spoken out openly against U.S. policy, 
nor warned of its lack of support in a conflict.  Japan, however, is not any more eager for 
armed conflict to come to the peninsula since it is also in range of North Korean missile 
strikes.  Instead of taking the South Korean position of speaking out against the U.S., 
Tokyo has used its recent warming of relations to address Pyongyang.  In 2002, Japanese 
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Kim Jong-il signed a joint declaration at a summit 
in Pyongyang.  Under this summit, Mr Kim vowed to extend the 1999 moratorium on 
ballistic missile testing apologized for kidnapping Japanese citizens during the Cold War.  
Of course, in return, Japan vowed to provide the North with economic aid when the two 
countries normalized diplomatic ties.377 
At the outset of tensions, Tokyo urged the regime to reopen talks with the 
IAEA and to dismantle its nuclear program.378  More recently, Japanese officials warned 
North Korea that long-range missile launches or other provocative acts by North Korea 
could terminate efforts to improve bilateral ties and cost the North billions of dollars in 
economic aid from Tokyo.379  While Japan is eager to pursue a diplomatic solution, it is 
preparing for worst-case scenarios.  Possibly fearing pre-emptive strikes, Japan has 
considered deploying two destroyers near North Korea to detect missile launches.380  In 
addition, Defense Minister Shigeru Ishiba, taking a defensive posture, warned North 
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Korea that it would launch counter attacks if it had evidence Pyongyang was preparing to 
launch ballistic missiles.381  
Like Japan, from the outset Russia has been trying to use its leverage and 
urge North Korea to cooperate with the IAEA.382 Also like Japan, Russia is concerned 
about Pyongyang’s reaction to any armed conflict.  Russian Defense Minister Sergei 
Ivanov’s “personal judgment is that the potential threat stemming from that part of the 
world can potentially outweigh what we are witnessing in Iraq”383  What Russia really 
wants is for the situation to “revert to the status quo as it was a few months ago,” he said.  
“We reject any attempts to exert military pressure on a sovereign state.”384   
Mr. Ivanov, made it know that Russia’s position was to “advocate a 
nuclear free status of the Korean peninsula and further dialogue between North and South 
Koreas.”385 He went on to say, that he believes the situation is “mainly an issue between 
the United States and the (North), but other countries also have a major interest in the 
situation."  Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov said it was a time for 
“quiet diplomacy” and added that it “is important to refrain from loud statements and 
from further antagonism of the sides.”386  
China certainly has a vested interest in persuading the United States to 
pursue non-confrontational avenues with North Korea.  During the similar nuclear crisis 
of 1994, one of the reasons that the United States wanted to avoid armed conflict is 
because they did not want to see Chinese military intervention.  Under the China-North 
Korea Friendship Treaty signed in 1961, in the event that North Korea was “cornered” as 
a result of an invasion by the U.S. and the ROK, China pledged to send 50,000 and 
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75,000 soldiers, as well as approximately 10,000 rapid deployment troops to North 
Korea.387   
Today, however, Beijing has made no secret of the fact it does not want to 
be drawn by the Kim regime -- which is despised by many cadres -- into a military 
conflagration.  Chinese President Hu Jingtao is prepared for the worst-case scenario as 
shown by his formation of the “Leading Group on the North Korean Crisis” 
(LGNKC).388   
One of China’s main fears in the event of a U.S.-DPRK conflict is 
manifest by the fact that “Beijing has moved additional troops and the para-military 
People's Armed Police to its northeastern border with North Korea partly as a precaution 
against the influx of refugees.”389  
Several Generals from the People’s Liberation Army of China have urged 
the Chinese leadership to “accede to Kim's demands for help against possible U.S. 
attacks,” but the LGNKC has not yet decided whether or not to provide military hardware 
to Pyongyang.  Instead, it is hoping that diplomacy will resolve the conflict.390 
 
3. 
                                                
Building a Multilateral “Asia Security” Coalition 
President George W. Bush is right in refusing to negotiate directly with 
Pyongyang during U.S.-North Korea tensions of 2003.  When the U.S. deals directly with 
North Korea, the U.S. does not fare very well.  In addition, little progress is made toward 
long-term peace.  Perhaps this is due to wide cultural gaps, perhaps because of the North 
Korean proficiency at manipulation, or perhaps it is because of the long-standing hatred 
of the U.S. by the successive Kim regimes.  Either way, if parties in the North Korean 
sphere of influence work with North Korea, the situation can much more easily be 
rectified.  In the last section it became apparent that none of the countries surrounding 
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North Korea have any desire to see armed conflict; each has made statements desiring 
diplomatic solutions.  It is obvious then that Senator Lugar hit on something when he 
said, “our strategy now has to be one of multilateral engagement” with other nations, 
such as Japan, China, Russia, which have a stake in continued peace on the Korean 
peninsula.391 
Reunification of the Korean peninsula is not likely to happen in the near future.  
There does not seem to be a peaceful way to conduct a regime change in the DPRK.  The 
way to create long-term peace and stability on the peninsula is through the formation of a 
multilateral “Asia Security” coalition (ASC), and through the systematic application of 
diplomatic measures.  The ASC would preferably be made up of the United States, 
China, Japan, South Korea, North Korea and Russia.  Along the same lines as the Truman 
Doctrine, this policy would put the onus of Asian Security on Asia.  The United States, 
while it would be an active participant, would adopt a less prominent role in Korean 
affairs.  In addition, the DPRK’s historic relationships, such as those with China and the 
former Soviet Union, can be exploited; and those that are more recent such as those with 
the ROK and Japan, can be nurtured.   
In order to provide for long-term security on the Korean peninsula, the ASC 
would adopt a two-fold strategy for dealing with the DPRK – U.S. military 
disengagement, and economic engagement.   
a. U.S. Military Disengagement  
According to Kim Jong Il, his regime continues to proliferate weapons of 
mass destruction because he is concerned about his nation’s security – specifically from 
attacks by the United States.  An “Asia security” coalition (ASC) would address this 
concern by first, supporting the staged disengagement of U.S. troops from the peninsula; 
and second, by filling a possible power vacuum by ensuring a stable security environment 
for the peninsula.  
As was outlined in the U.S. Role section of the Reunification option, the 
disengagement of the U.S. from the peninsula is possible.  The environment is ripe due to 
                                                 




increased South Korean protests of U.S. presence, and plans have been outlined by 
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld.  Building on this plan, in his book Korean Endgame, 
Selig Harrison, Director of the National Security Program at the Center for International 
Policy, goes into great detail outlining a gradual reduction of U.S. forces that could be 
adopted by the ASC.392   
The first step for the ASC is to negotiate the “pullback of forward-
deployed North Korean forces with an offensive capability, especially heavy artillery, 
multiple rocket launchers, and armor, out of artillery range of Seoul.”  In return, CFC 
forces would also pull back from their forward positions.  Since the pullback would be 
asymmetrical, Washington and Seoul, through the ASC would “negotiate the removal of 
weapons systems regarded by Pyongyang as offensive.” 393   This could include a partial 
withdrawal of forces from the peninsula, at first to be retained nearby in Japan, Guam 
and/or Hawaii to maximize security.  In addition, “command, control, targeting and 
intelligence facilities must be retained in South Korea by the U.S.” 394   Once the 
immediate threat assumedly posed by the U.S. is neutralized, the DPRK’s nuclear and 
missile threats could be negotiated with further U.S. troop withdrawal over time.395  Not 
only would a gradual disengagement prevent the threat of a North Korean attack, it would 
also give the South time to enhance its military capabilities and to replace U.S. forces.  
Partially to ensure regional security and the interest that the United States has in the 
region, the CFC would be replaced by joint U.S. - Japanese forces in Japan.396  While 
some would argue that U.S. disengagement would be equivalent to the “world's Sole 
Superpower" yielding to blackmail, Bill Taylor has it right when he calls it “diplomacy in 
pursuit of U.S. and international interests in peace and stability in Northeast Asia.” 397  
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Since the DPRK has called for a treaty of non-aggression with the United 
States, the second phase for peninsular security would be for the U.S., China, Russia, and 
Japan, to cancel corresponding unilateral security agreements with both Seoul and 
Pyongyang.  Instead, the ASC would provide a multilateral non-aggression agreement to 
both South and North Korea.  In this agreement, however, the ASC would pledge to 
provide military support to either, in the event of an attack by the other, in an attempt to 
unify by force.398  In addition, to alleviate concerns that a power vacuum would open up 
on the peninsula, the ASC would provide an agreement that bars the introduction of 
foreign military forces into the peninsula. 399  
One last measure for Korean physical security, is the formal recognition 
by the ASC for both Koreas to exist.  While the ASC would be supportive of the eventual 
reunification of the country, it would agree to leave the matter to be negotiated strictly by 
the Koreas.  
b. Economic Engagement 
According to this thesis, economics, not national security is the primary 
driving force behind Pyongyang’s actions.  Specifically, the DPRK's nuclear proliferation 
efforts are part of a plan to extort capital from the U.S. and its allies, to keep the dying 
regime afloat.  Providing economic security to Pyongyang will go a long way to bringing 
security to the peninsula.  This security, however, is the responsibility of not just one, but 
all of the nations of the ASC.  
 
i. Japan’s Role 
One of the most important relationships that North Korea has with 
Japan is an economic one.   With the end of the Cold War and the Russians and Chinese 
turning away from the DPRK, North Korea looked toward Japan to provide economic 
assistance.400  While historically there were numerous causes for disagreement: the 
amount of reparations requested by the DPRK for occupation damages; Japan’s 
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400 In addition, leaders in Pyongyang were trying to put a wedge between South Korea and Japan. 
insistence that North Korea had kidnapped Japanese citizens; and Japan’s demand that 
North Korea resolve its differences with South Korea over nuclear inspections; Japan and 
North Korea finally appear to have gotten past these issues.    
Tokyo’s Chief Cabinet secretary Aoki Mikio announced that, 
“Tokyo is restarting talks with Pyongyang because diplomatic ties are essential for 
stability across the region.”401  While those particular talks ended early with the Japanese 
delegation leaving North Korea over the colonial reparations issue, it would not be long 
before those issues would finally be put to rest.   
In September 2002, an historical summit was conducted between 
Kim Jong Il and Japanese prime minister Koizumi Junichiro.402  During the 
unprecedented summit, Mr. Kim made a startling admission that North Korean 
commandos had indeed kidnapped several Japanese citizens, expressed a sincere apology 
to his counterpart, and promised that it would not happen again.  Mr. Kim’s apology 
remained conspicuously absent from the subsequent DPRK-Japan Pyongyang agreement.  
Mr. Koizumi’s sincere apology for the fact that Japan had inflicted damage and sufferings 
upon the Korean people during its colonial rule over Korea – the first time such an 
official apology was made –was, however, written into the agreement.  Tokyo also 
promised to render economic cooperation to Pyongyang in the form of grants, low-
interest long-term loans and humanitarian aid and to “provide loans and credit through 
the International Cooperation Bank of Japan, etc. from the viewpoint of aiding non-
governmental economic activities in the period both sides think appropriate after the 
normalization of diplomatic ties.”403  In return, Pyongyang made a carefully worded 
pledge to “observe all the international agreements for a comprehensive solution to the 
nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula,” and the DPRK pledged to extend its moratorium 
on missile tests beyond 2003. 404  
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While it appears that tensions are on the rise between Japan and the 
DPRK instead, it just might be that the banter between Japan and the DPRK is promoting 
a new sense of respect for Japan by the DPRK, and is serving to set limits.405  Recently 
Tokyo has warned North Korea that it will take pre-emptive military action if Pyongyang 
plans to launch a missile attack against Japan.406  On the other hand, Tokyo has been 
very careful to point out that so far Pyongyang has not yet violated the 2002 historic joint 
declaration with North Korea, which opened talks towards the normalization of ties.407  It 
is this continued respect for the 2002 agreement, coupled with the fact that currently 
Japan conducts $370 million dollars in trade annually with the DPRK, that sets Japan up 
to be a major economic link between the ASC and North Korea.  
ii. South Korea’s Role 
South Korea is currently a significant trading partner to the DPRK.  
Most of the ROK’s  $350 million annual trade with its northern neighbor is from sending 
textiles to North Korea and buying back finished clothes.408  In addition to this current 
trade, South Korean President Roh has stated on numerous occasions that he is interested 
in continuing to pursue the engagement policies set up by his predecessor.   
It appears that South Korea is already well on its way to fulfilling 
the economic aid to North Korea that being a member state of the ASC would require.  
Despite the current situation on the peninsula, throughout March 2003, South Korea has 
continued to pledge economic support for the North.  For example, inter-Korean trade has 
already increased fifty-eight percent from 2002.409  The ROK also agreed to provide 1.3 
million tons of rice to North Korea, in addition to more than $19 million it has promised 
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through various humanitarian aid projects.410  In addition, plans have been made to re-
connect the North-South Korean railroad by April, 2003.411   
iii. Russia’s Role 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation has 
been preoccupied with building its own economy.  This fact is highlighted by the fact that 
between 1992 and 2000, Russian-North Korean bilateral trade dropped from $600 million 
to $105 million a year.412  In the last several years, however, Russia has looked toward 
warming its economic relations with the DPRK.  In July 2000, Russian President 
Vladimir Putin visited Pyongyang and negotiated the DPRK-Russia Joint Declaration.  In 
the declaration, among other things, the two nations pledged to “actively develop trade, 
economic and scientific and technological ties between the two sides and create legal, 
financial and economic conditions favourable (sic) for this.”413  Again in 2001, the two 
leaders reconfirmed their commitments when Kim Jong Il traveled to Moscow to meet 
with President Putin.414  
In 2002, Alexander Yakovenko, spokesman for the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs, said that Russia is greatly interested in implementing multilateral 
economic projects with North Korea, specifically he said, their greatest hopes were 
pinned on working towards linking the two countries via Russia's Trans-Siberian 
Railroad.415  While Russia still does not have the capital to make major investments in 
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North Korea, the historical economic relationship and renewed diplomacy between 
Moscow and Pyongyang will facilitate even diplomacy in the ASC. 
 
iv. China’s Role 
China also has a serious economic interest in Pyongyang for both 
political and economic reasons.  As the North's most important trading partner, China’s 
trade with North Korea hit more than $700 million in 2002, up 30 percent over 2001.416  
In addition, China provides ninety percent of the North’s energy.417   With the recent 
cutoff of U.S. fuel supplies to Pyongyang, China is now believed to supply about 70 
percent of the North's oil, experts said, and China has also doubled its sales of grain and 
vegetables.418  
In recent months, however, Chinese officials have refused to get 
directly involved in the DPRK’s nuclear proliferation issue.  One senior Chinese official 
explained that there is an internal struggle between younger Chinese officials who believe 
China should take a greater role in international affairs and more conservative officials 
who believe China should focus on economic development, and should prop up the North 
Korean government no matter what.419  The latter concern is based on fears that the 
North's sputtering economy could lead to a regime collapse, and subsequent absorption of 
the DPRK into South Korea.  This, Chinese officials fear, would bring the South Koreans 
and their American allies up to China’s border.  They are also concerned that this would 
force South Korea, which has invested billions in China, to devote all its resources to 
absorbing the North. 420  
The formation of the ASC would allow for the younger Chinese to 
realize their goal of an increased international role.  As well, the diminished threat and 
disengagement of the United States would pacify the more conservative officials.  This 
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would set the stage for the role that China would play in providing economic assistance 
to the DPRK to prevent regime collapse.421 
v. The United States’ Role 
Since the main objective is to return responsibility for North Korea 
back to its Asian neighbors, it is these countries that will provide the majority of 
economic support to the nation.  While the United States would disengage militarily, and 
for the most part politically, from the peninsula, it would still have an economic role to 
play as a member of the ASC.  Since 1995, the United States has provided more than 
$500 million in food and other commodities to North Korea - up to 350,000 metric tons 
of food each year.422  Just in food alone, the U.S. has contributed nearly 2 million metric 
tons since 1995.423   
Not only has the United States provided approximately 3.3 million 
barrels of fuel oil to the DPRK under the Agreed Framework, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) have provided alternate energy sources to villages in the DPRK.424  
In addition, such NGOs have provided immeasurable medical and humanitarian aid to the 
people of the DPRK.425  As an ASC member, the United States would continue to 
contribute to the North Korean economy by supporting these same humanitarian aid 
programs, and by continuing to provide food and energy.  
 
vi. North Korea’s Role 
All of this economic aid and security must come at a price, to be 
paid by Pyongyang.  There are several responsibilities that North Korea as part of the 
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ASC would have to meet.  First is to end its nuclear proliferation efforts and to dismantle 
its current nuclear projects.  With its security concerns alleviated, this should not be a 
problem for the Kim regime.  Second, the DPRK must address humanitarian issues and 
must work toward real and tangible economic reform in the country.  Since Kim Jong Il 
has appeared to be sincere in negotiating treaties, but has continued to violate them, in 
order for this multilateral approach to work, Kim Jong Il must comply with the ASC.  
This means everything from allowing full inspections of nuclear facilities, to allowing 
verification of humanitarian aid recipients.   There is really no reason the DPRK would 
refuse to cooperate with the ASC.  With trade and economic support through the 
combined efforts of the Asian economic giants, North Korea could build a viable 
economy, thereby strengthening the country and legitimizing the Kim Jong Il regime. 
C. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Even while attempting to keep their national Juché ideology intact, North Korean 
leaders have manipulated it to serve their own goals.  History suggests that when the 
leaders of the DPRK became desperate for economic aid, they first attempted to make 
lucrative alliances.  When that approach fell short of the DPRK’s economic goals, they 
turned to more drastic measures and began threatening the security of the region i.e.: 
selling missiles and technology, effecting the crisis of 1994, and proliferating WMD.   
The United States’ post-framework policies continued to support the Agreed 
Framework and to give North Korea the benefit of the doubt even when it was not 
fulfilling its obligations.  It turns out that the DPRK has continued to ensure that these 
bilateral agreements contain loopholes.  Despite the fact that he dismisses these tactics as 
the actions of a “good negotiator,” Selig S. Harrison points out that in the 1994 nuclear 
freeze agreement and 1999 missile-testing moratorium, for example, the DPRK’s leaders 
put the onus on the United States for assuring DPRK compliance.  They used conditional 
phrases such as if the United States “fully normalized relations” and made “formal 
assurances to the DPRK against the threat or use of nuclear weapons.”426   Therefore, in 
such agreements, the regime did not actually relinquish the option of resuming its nuclear 
and missile programs...which it has done.”427   
                                                 
426 Harrison, 201.  
427 Ibid.  
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So while the current Bush administration at first attempted to pursue a 
constructive relationship with Pyongyang, the lack of good faith negotiations and 
disclosure of its treaty violations and proliferation activities, quickly ended the unilateral 
relationship between the U.S. and the DPRK.  These facts coupled with its continued 
organized militarism has caused President George W. Bush to identify the DPRK as a 
rogue state, making it, along with Iraq and Iran, an international pariah.  
So far the DPRK’s threats have been more bark than bite, because the United 
States has paid heavy ransoms to the Kim regimes for security in Asia.  But, in light of 
the fact that the DPRK possesses chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the 
means by which to deploy them, every threat should be taken seriously.  Another 
impending threat to United States national security is not necessarily from North Korea 
itself, but rather from its customers.  There is evidence that when negotiations fail and 
economic aid ceases from Asia and the West, the DPRK turns to other nations such as 
Iraq for income, namely by exporting weapons.  We must not rule out the possibility that 
behind the North Korean disclosure of WMD capability is a veiled threat to the U.S. that 
it would provide such weapons to enemies of the United States – possibly the leaders of 
the Arab world who are engaging in anti-American acts of terrorism.   
Eliminating both the imminent and long-term conventional and WMD threat 
posed by the DPRK should be the priority of U.S.-North Korean policy.  The DPRK 
WMD issue, especially in view of the rise of the international threat of terrorism, presents 
a clear and present danger to U.S. vital interests, its assets, and its allies in the region.  
Because this climate of threat exists, and the fact that the DPRK continues to show scorn 
for its bilateral relationship with the United States, Washington must convince its 
regional allies, and those with economic and security interests in the region, to take a 
more active role.  China, Japan, the ROK, and Russia need to join the United States in 
creating a security coalition that would serve to provide the DPRK a more secure national 
environment and to help bolster its economy through trade and diplomacy, thereby 
creating stability on the peninsula.  
The Asia Security Coalition would meet Kim Jong Il’s current demands for 
security assurances and provide a way for the country to become economically viable.  
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For North Korea, it is a win-win situation.  In order for such an option to work on the 
other hand, this coalition as a whole must adopt a less conciliatory, more firm stance 
towards the DPRK, with regard to holding the North to its responsibilities.  While the 
primary responsibility for the United States would be gradual disengagement from the 
peninsula, U.S. policymakers, through the ASC, should make some long-term demands.  
A “gamesman” who prides himself at getting something for nothing, Kim Jong Il must be 
forced to disarm, to cease his WMD proliferation programs and to better the living 
conditions of the North Korean people.   
Barring a peaceful regime change, diplomacy is the best option for working to 
attain long-term peace on the peninsula, and United States policymakers should certainly 
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